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ABSTRACT
Audit Quality: Detection of Material Misstatement
Megan Jones
This dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine characteristics that have the potential
to influence auditors’ ability to detect material misstatement and therefore, audit quality.
The first study examines the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection
process, and its relation to audit quality. This archival study concentrates on the group of
companies that hire audit firms after Part II inspection reports containing quality control criticisms
are made public. Results suggest that companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have
lower audit quality than companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports. Further,
companies that switch to Part II report auditors do not appear to negotiate lower fees. This
demonstrates an unintended consequence of Part II inspection reports. It is possible that some
companies are using the reports to identify low-quality auditors that may be less likely to detect
material misstatement.
The second study focuses on the influence of auditor substitution on professional skepticism.
Staffing changes are necessary in practice due to auditor turnover and changes in client timing,
which may result in a substitute auditor completing a task that is already started. The skepticism
level may be lower for a substitute auditor compared to an auditor completing an entire task due
to lack of information or lower feelings of meaningfulness and psychological ownership of the
task. An experiment was conducted with professional accountants demonstrating that substitute
auditors were less skeptical than auditors completing an entire task from start to finish. Evidence
does not support that substitute auditors had lower feelings of meaningfulness and psychological
ownership resulting in lower skepticism. However, results do suggest that substitute auditors are
less skeptical in their judgment because red flags were not all transferred. This lower skeptical
judgment then led to less skeptical action by the substitute auditors. The decline in skepticism may
harm substitute auditors’ ability to detect material misstatement.
Lastly, study three focuses on how fraud inquiries of management are conducted. The audit
standards include inquiries of management that mention the word fraud and are closed type
questions. However, the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) recommends avoiding the word fraud
when having conversations with management regarding fraud risks. Also, the CAQ recommends
questions that are all open-ended type. This study aims to explore whether slight changes in the
verbiage of management inquiries could increase the likelihood fraud reporting to inquiring
auditors. Results from an experiment using Amazon Mechanical Turk participants indicates that
avoiding the word fraud increases the likelihood of reporting when closed type questions are used
and the auditor lacks rapport with the client. Practically, this suggests that auditors lacking rapport
with the client and using the inquiries from the standards (closed type questions which mention
the word fraud), may be able to increase the likelihood of reporting by simply avoiding the word
fraud. If clients are willing to share fraud risks, auditors would be in a better position to adjust the
audit plan, and hopefully, have a better chance of detecting material misstatement due to fraud.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation investigates various aspects of the audit process and their relation to audit
quality, specifically as it relates to the auditors’ ability to detect material misstatements, including
those resulting from fraud. While the definition of audit quality varies in the literature, I adopt the
Gaynor et al. (2016, 5) definition and consider a higher quality audit as “one that provides a higher
level of assurance that the auditor obtained sufficient appropriate evidence that the financial
statements faithfully represent the firm’s underlying economics.” Recent summaries of the audit
quality literature stress that researchers need to be cognizant of the multi-faceted nature of this
construct and the many ways in which it can be measured (Francis 2011; Gaynor et al. 2016;
Knechel et al. 2013). Gaynor et al. (2016) recommends the Bonner (2008) framework, which
focuses on variations in judgment and decision-making due to characteristics of the environment,
task, and person, to examine audit quality. While much of the existing literature focuses on
personal traits that influence judgment and decision making (Gaynor et al. 2016), I focus on the
other two categories, features of the audit environment and audit task that may influence judgment
and decision making and ultimately, audit quality. Figure 1-1 maps the three research studies
included in this dissertation to the Bonner (2008) framework.
[Insert Figure 1-1]
The first study, described in Chapter 2, concentrates on an environmental factor, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection process, and the relation to audit
quality. Prior literature has demonstrated that Part II PCAOB inspection reports, which describe
audit firms’ quality control deficiencies, signal audit quality. Muriel (2013) and Nagy (2014)
provide evidence that audit firms tend to lose clients subsequent to the release of a Part II
inspection report. However, Nagy (2014) also demonstrates that these audit firms do attract new
clients after receiving a Part II report. Study one extends this line of literature by exploring why
1

companies might be attracted to firms that have been identified to be providers of poor quality
audits.
Two possible explanations are examined. First, clients may prefer a low-quality audit.
Regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that companies engage in “opinion shopping,”
which refers to switching to an audit firm that will issue an opinion consistent with managements’
preferences (Lennox 2000, Newton, Persellin, Wang, and Walkins 2016; PCAOB 2011).
Companies with weak internal controls or poor financial reporting quality may hire Part II report
auditors to obtain a less thorough audit to increase their chances of obtaining an unqualified
opinion despite material misstatements. A second possibility is that clients may switch to a Part II
report auditor to negotiate lower fees. Audit firms, especially smaller firms facing a more
competitive market, tend to discount audit fees in the initial year of the engagement as they expect
to recoup the discount in future years (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006). In addition to the initial year
discount, companies may be able to negotiate a further discount due to the possible reputational
harm experienced from the firm receiving a Part II report.
An archival approach is used to compare companies that switch to an auditor with a recent
Part II report to a matched sample of companies that switch to an auditor without a Part II report.
Results suggest that companies that switch to Part II auditors have lower audit quality, as measured
by discretionary accruals in the first financial statements following the switch, than companies that
switch to auditors without Part II reports. The evidence does not support that companies switch to
Part II auditors to negotiate lower fees. These findings highlight a potential unintended
consequence of the Part II inspection reports - companies that desire low quality audits may use
these reports to identify audit firms with quality control issues that are less likely to detect material
misstatements.
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The second and third studies use experimental design to examine features of audit tasks
that may influence audit quality. Study two, described in Chapter 3, investigates the influence of
auditor substitution, one auditor completing a task already started by another auditor, on audit
quality. Auditor substitution is necessary in practice due to auditor turnover, changes in client
timing, and other unforeseen circumstances. The PCAOB recently identified excessive auditor
turnover, both firm and engagement team turnover, as a potential indicator of poor audit quality
(PCAOB 2015). Both the current audit standards (PCAOB 2010a, AS 2101) and prior research
(e.g. Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; O’Keefe et al. 1994; Stein et al. 1994) discuss the
importance of assembling an appropriate audit team during the planning phase. Study two will
extend this line of literature by investigating the effect of staffing changes after the audit begins.
It is possible that not all information transfers seamlessly from the original auditor to the
substitute auditor completing a task. As professional skepticism has been described as an attitude
or a mindset (Hurtt et al. 2013; Nelson 2009; PCAOB 2012), it is likely more difficult to transfer
than tangible audit evidence. Regulators have criticized auditors for lacking a sufficient level of
professional skepticism (PCAOB 2011). This study examines whether auditor substitution is one
possible barrier to skepticism.
First, it is possible that substitute auditors are less skeptical because they are missing
information. While most information is documented in the audit workpapers, some information
learned about the client that is not directly related to the task may not be included. Second,
substitute auditors may be less skeptical due to lower feelings of meaningfulness and ownership
from only completing part of a task. The Hackman and Oldham (1976) Job Characteristics Model
describes the concept of task identity, which specifies the portion of job that is performed from
start to finish. Completing a job from start to finish (i.e. high task identity) has been shown to
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increase performance via an increase in meaningfulness and ownership of the task (Humphrey et
al. 2007; Pierce et al. 2009).
An experiment with public accountants is conducted to examine the influence of auditor
substitution on skeptical judgment and action. Participants that completed only the last portion of
the task are less skeptical of the controller’s honesty and request less audit evidence than
participants that completed the entire task. Additional analyses suggest that this decline in
skepticism is due to substitute auditors missing information and not a result of feelings associated
with lower task identity. Per mediation tests, substitute auditors missing the red flag relating to a
disagreement with the controller are less skeptical of the controller’s honesty and therefore, request
less audit evidence. If substitute auditors do not respond to discrepancies with appropriate
procedures because they are missing information, this could hinder their ability to detect material
misstatements.
Lastly, the third study, included in Chapter 4, explores the characteristics of a specific audit
task, fraud inquiries of management. Audit standards require that auditors inquire about fraud risks
as part of the risk assessment procedures conducted during the planning phase of the audit to assist
in developing planned testing procedures (PCAOB 2010b, AS 2110). Kaplan et al. (2011) provide
experimental evidence that lends support to the fraud inquiry process. They demonstrate that
individuals are more likely to report potential fraud to an inquiring auditor as compared to an
auditor that does not ask about fraud risks. Study three extends this line of literature by examining
if the nature and type of questions, along with the rapport between the auditor and client, influences
the likelihood of reporting.
The Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) recommends avoiding the word fraud when
discussing fraud risks with management (CAQ 2010). The whistleblowing literature also seems to
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support this position. The likelihood of fraud reporting increases when there is a lower chance of
retaliation or fewer personal costs involved in reporting (e.g., Seifert et al. 2010; Zhang et al.
2013). It is likely that employees will perceive a higher personal risk of reporting when the word
fraud is mentioned, and therefore, may be less likely to share information relating to potential fraud
when asked by the auditor. As the audit standards include the word fraud in the recommended
auditor inquiries of management (PCAOB 2010b, AS 2110), this study investigates if the auditor
would be able to obtain more information relating to fraud risks with a slight change in verbiage.
Additionally, investigative interview guidance recommends that interviewers use open-ended
questions as a means of encouraging participation and transferring control to the interviewee
(Fisher and Geiselman 1992; Walsh and Bull 2012). As some of the inquiries in the audit standard
are phrased as closed type questions, this study examines whether open-ended questions may
increase the likelihood of fraud reporting.
Lastly, this study considers the relationship between the auditor and the client, and its
influence on reporting. Bennett and Hatfield (2016) note that audit partners believe relationshipbuilding is a necessity for obtaining sufficient audit evidence. Criminology research has
demonstrated that when rapport is present during an interview it can reduce the interviewee anxiety
(Kieckhaefer et al. 2014) and increase the amount of correct information that is reported (Collins
et al. 2002). It is possible that simple rapport-building techniques, such as using the interviewee’s
name and disclosing personal information, may increase the likelihood of fraud reporting.
Participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk that have prior work experience are recruited
to complete the experiment. Participants are asked to assume the role of the client and are provided
a scenario that describes a possible fraud involving their direct supervisor. They then decide
whether to report the fraud to the inquiring auditor. If they select to report, they forgo a small
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bonus to proxy for the costs associated with reporting in practice. Results suggest when rapport is
absent between the auditor and the client and a closed type question is used, clients are more likely
to report when the word fraud is avoided as compared to mentioned by the auditor. This finding is
consistent with the recommendation by the CAQ and has practical implications for auditors. As
the current standards specify fraud inquiries that are closed questions which include the word
fraud, the likelihood of client reporting may be diminished if the auditor lacks rapport with the
client. Avoiding the word fraud or ensuring that the auditor performing the interview has
established rapport with the auditor may increase the likelihood of reporting.
By examining these components of the fraud inquiry task, this study provides initial insight
as to the best practices to increase the likelihood of client reporting during auditors’ fraud inquiries
of management. Prior research has noted that auditors have difficulty responding to fraud risks
with the appropriate testing procedures (Trompeter et al. 2013); however, Hammersley et al.
(2011) note that auditors are better at modifying procedures when more specific fraud risks are
identified. If clients are more willing to discuss fraud risks during these inquiries, it would likely
help auditors identify specific risks and modify their testing procedures to have a higher likelihood
of detecting potential fraud.
This dissertation is organized as follows: chapters 2 through 4 present my three studies.
Each chapter includes an introduction to the study, overview of the relevant literature and
hypothesis development, methodology, results, and discussion of limitations and implications.
Finally, chapter 5 offers a summary and suggestions for future research.
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Figure 1-1: Audit Quality Framework
(Adapted from Bonner, 2008 & Gaynor et al., 2016)

Study1:
Environment

Study 2 and 3:
Task

Person
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CHAPTER 2: INVESTIGATING THE DEMAND FOR LOW AUDIT QUALITY: AN
INVESTIGATION OF COMPANIES THAT HIRE TRIENNIAL AUDITORS AFTER
RECEIVING A PART II REPORT

Jared Eutsler
University of North Texas
D. Kip Holderness Jr.
West Virginia University
Megan M. Jones
West Virginia University
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I. INTRODUCTION
Investors and other market participants demand audit quality as a mechanism to decrease
information risk. These external parties cannot observe the audit process, so they use other publicly
available information to assess audit quality. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) inspection reports are one such signal of audit quality. The PCAOB's Part II inspection
reports describe systematic quality control criticisms that were not remediated by the firm (within
twelve months) and serve as a signal of audit quality (Carlisle, Church, and Yu 2017; Muriel 2013;
Nagy 2014). Audit firms which receive a public Part II inspection report experience a significant
loss in clients following the issuance of the report through a decreased ability to attract new clients
and retain existing clients (Nagy 2014), which suggests a demand for audit quality. However, while
these auditors have an overall reduction in the number of clients, they still attract some new clients
in the subsequent year. We investigate possible reasons why companies would engage auditors
following the receipt of a Part II report, which signals poor audit quality. We propose two possible
explanations for why companies would choose to hire an auditor following the issuance of a Part
II report: 1) to obtain a lower quality audit; and 2) to obtain a reduction in audit fees.
Both regulators and researchers have expressed concerns of clients engaging in “opinion
shopping” or switching to an audit firm with the goal of obtaining an opinion that is consistent
with managements’ preferences (Lennox 2000; Newton, Persellin, Wang, and Wilkins 2016;
PCAOB 2011). Companies with low financial reporting quality or weak internal controls may
prefer a low-quality audit because it may increase the likelihood of a clean opinion despite material
misstatements or internal control weaknesses. Companies seeking low-quality auditors may view
Part II reports as indicative of poor quality. Although quality control deficiencies do not
necessarily indicate prior lapses in audit quality, they suggest that the audit firms' internal
processes might not be functioning properly to ensure consistent, high quality audits.
11

Another incentive to switch to an auditor who receives a Part II report may be to reduce
audit fees. Companies are typically able to negotiate lower fees in the initial year of the audit
(DeAngelo 1981). It may be that companies hiring auditors with a public Part II can obtain
additional discounts due to the tarnished reputation of such auditors. We investigate whether
companies that switch to auditors with Part II inspection reports indicating systematic quality
control issues receive a lower audit quality or a reduction in audit fees.
To do so, we analyze a sample of clients that switch to triennially inspected auditors (i.e.
those auditing fewer than 100 issuers a year) subsequent to the issuance of a public Part II
inspection report. We examine switches to smaller, triennially inspected auditors because these
firms are likely to suffer greater reputational harm resulting from negative PCAOB reports than
large, annually inspected firms with an established brand name (Abbott, Gunny, and Zhang 2013).
We compare companies that switch to triennial auditors who have received a public Part II report
within the past two years to a matched sample of companies that switch to triennial auditors who
have not received a public Part II report. This sample allows us to evaluate the differences between
auditor switches in terms of audit quality (i.e., performance-adjusted discretionary accruals;
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005) and audit fees.
Results of our univariate analysis indicate that companies which hire auditors following
the issuance of a Part II report are very small and have poor financial performance. This provides
them with a stronger incentive to hire an audit firm which would allow them to present a more
favorable financial position (e.g., “opinion shopping) or which would work for reduced audit fees.
We find companies that switch to auditors with a Part II report are associated with higher levels of
discretionary accruals, which indicates lower audit quality, in the first issued financial statements
following the switch. We find no such difference prior to the switch. Univariate analyses indicate
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that companies that switch to auditors with a Part II report pay lower audit fees when compared to
companies that switch to auditors without a Part II report. However, once control variables are
introduced, multivariate analyses indicate that companies switching to Part II auditors do not
negotiate lower fees. We also conduct difference-in-difference tests that yield the same results for
our measures of audit quality and fees. In summary, for the companies in our sample that are
audited by triennial firms, our results are consistent with a revealed preference for lower audit
quality rather than discounted audit fees.
These findings support previous literature suggesting PCAOB inspection reports are a
useful signal of audit quality by indicating that companies which switch to auditors with a Part II
report have lower audit quality than those that switch to auditors without a Part II report. While
most companies avoid auditors with poor quality (Nagy 2014), we provide evidence that the
PCAOB's reporting process may have an unintended consequence of highlighting poor audit
quality for companies that desire a lower quality audit. For companies that switch to auditors with
revealed quality control issues, it is possible that a Part II report may serve as an effective
advertisement of poor audit quality. Our results are also consistent with previous research that
documents increased financial reporting fraud for smaller companies that employ triennially
inspected audit firms (Hermanson, Houston, and Rice 2007). If companies are shopping for low
quality audits, they may be more likely to be engaged in fraud. This paper has implications for the
PCAOB, which may wish to identify instances of poor audit quality, as well as consider the
possible unintended consequences of their inspection reports. Further, our results have potential
implications for investors of triennially inspected firms with Part II inspection reports.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II presents the relevant
literature and hypothesis development, section III discusses the research method and data, section
IV reports the results, and section V offers a conclusion.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
PCAOB Inspections
The PCAOB was created to oversee public company audits with the goal of improving
audit quality (PCAOB 2006). Along with the registration of audit firms and standard-setting, the
PCAOB is responsible for performing inspections and enforcing disciplinary actions (Abernathy,
Barnes, and Stefaniak 2013). PCAOB inspections are performed to assess the audit firm’s
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
provisions, and professional auditing standards (PCAOB 2004; Riley, Jenkins, Roush, and
Thibodeau 2008). Per Section 104 of SOX, firms that provide audit services for greater than 100
issuers are inspected annually, whereas firms that provide audit services for fewer than 100 issuers
are required to be inspected on a triennial basis (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). In addition
to performing inspections of specific audit engagements selected using a risk-based approach,
regulators also evaluate the audit firms’ quality control system (PCAOB 2006). Part I of the
inspection report describes audit deficiencies noted on specific engagements and is released to the
public. Quality control criticisms are documented in Part II of the report and are not disclosed to
the public unless the issues are not adequately addressed within a twelve-month remediation period
(PCAOB 2006).
Part I of the Inspection Report
The PCAOB’s Audit Quality Indicator (AQI) project considers inspection report
deficiencies to be one marker of audit quality (PCAOB 2015a). However, the stream of academic
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literature that investigates whether Part I of the inspection reports are informative to clients and
other market participants indicates mixed findings. Glover, Prawitt, and Taylor (2009) criticize the
inspection reporting process for its lack of transparency and specific information explaining the
severity of the deficiencies identified. Empirical evidence provided by Lennox and Pittman (2010)
supports this position. Their findings suggest clients find the inspection reports from the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) peer review program to be informative, but not
the PCAOB's inspection reports. In their sample, audit firms with weaknesses noted in the
PCAOB's inspection reports are not associated with a reduction in the auditor’s client base. The
authors attribute this difference to the additional information included in the peer review reports,
specifically the type of inspection report (i.e., unmodified, modified, or adverse) and the inclusion
of systematic weaknesses that impact the quality controls of the firm.
More recent research suggests that certain features of the Part I inspection reports may
signal audit quality. Eutsler (2018) provides evidence that account-specific findings for annually
inspected firms are generalizable to the audit quality of the deficient account for the firm’s clients
exhibiting the highest selection risk. Gunny and Zhang (2013) provide evidence that triennially
inspected auditors that receive a deficient Part I inspection report relating to a material GAAP
departure are associated with lower audit quality. Similarly, Abbott et al. (2013) provide evidence
that inspection reports of smaller, triennially inspected auditors are informative to clients. In their
sample of triennially inspected firm reports from 2005-2007, clients are more likely to switch
auditors after a GAAP-deficient Part I inspection report. The authors posit that clients of triennially
inspected auditors may be more likely to switch auditors than those of annually inspected auditors
after a negative inspection report due to lower switching costs resulting from a more competitive
audit market and smaller client size. Daugherty, Dickins, and Tervo (2011) provide evidence
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consistent with this notion. Their findings suggest clients of triennially inspected auditors are more
likely to dismiss auditors with deficient inspection reports in favor of auditors without a negative
PCAOB report. Overall, this evidence suggests that Part I findings, specifically those that relate to
GAAP deficiencies, appear to signal audit quality for triennially inspected auditors.
Part II of the Inspection Report: Quality Controls
While much of the literature has concentrated on Part I PCAOB's findings, recent research
has begun to focus on Part II deficiencies. The second part of the PCAOB's inspection report relates
to overall quality control criticisms. The PCAOB adopted the AICPA’s Statements on Quality
Control (QC) Standards issued by the Accounting Standards Board (PCAOB 2003). Per QC
Section 20.07, for an effective quality control system, accounting firms should implement five
elements including: (1) independence, integrity, and objectivity, (2) personnel management, (3)
acceptance and continuance of clients and engagements, (4) engagement performance, and (5)
monitoring (PCAOB 2003). When reflecting on the impact of the inspections on current audit
quality, Helen A. Munter, Director of Registration and Inspections, (PCAOB 2015b) said:
Righting the ship is not simply about the number of audit deficiencies that appear
in the public portion of a firm’s inspection report – the items we call Part 1 findings.
Of course they matter. They are important. Our goal, however, in inspections, and
what I view as a priority, is to address firm’s systemic issues, and the potential
deficiencies in a firm’s system of quality controls.
Quality control systems vary among audit firms. QC Section 20.04 states that quality
controls should be implemented considering the firm’s size, number of offices, knowledge and
experience of personnel, and complexity of the firm’s practice (PCAOB 2003). Smaller firms may
have difficulty implementing an acceptable quality control system as compared to larger firms.
However, strategies such as building alliances and becoming niche providers are tactics employed
by small firms to meet the necessary level of quality control (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, and Jenkins
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2008). The PCAOB inspection team identifies quality control deficiencies from individually
selected audit engagements (i.e. bottom-up generalization) and from a top-down review that
focuses on organizational level issues (Aobdia 2017). However, due to the less formalized policies
and procedures at smaller audit firms, quality control criticisms noted during inspections of smaller
firms are generally derived from deficiencies noted during inspections of individual audits
(PCAOB 2006).
Per SOX Section 104(g)(2), these quality control deficiencies remain confidential unless
they are not addressed by the audit firms within a twelve-month remediation period. To keep the
quality control criticism(s) confidential, a Rule 4009 submission is required by the audit firm to
demonstrate a reasonable plan to address the criticism(s) and a good faith effort in making progress
towards remediation (PCAOB 2006). Firms are not required to make a Rule 4009 submission, but
if not, the criticism will become public, and if warranted the Board can take disciplinary action
against the firm (PCAOB 2006).
Recognizing the importance of Part II inspection deficiencies, accounting research has
recently examined client reaction to public Part II reports containing quality control criticisms that
were not remediated. Muriel (2013) examines the impact of the 2007 Deloitte Part II report on the
firms’ market share. She documents that clients operating in a litigious industry and those that
have longer tenures with Deloitte were more likely to switch auditors after the Part II report. Nagy
(2014) extends this line of literature by investigating client reactions to Part II inspection reports
of all audit firms, including triennially inspected firms. The sample includes 56 firms, all
triennially inspected with the exception of Deloitte, that have received public Part II inspection
reports as of November 2013. The most common criticisms in the quality control inspection reports
relate to technical competency, due care, and professional skepticism. Results suggest that auditors
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with public disclosures of quality control criticisms lose a significant portion of their market share
compared to a matched sample of firms without Part II findings. These studies suggest that clients
perceive Part II reports to be a signal of audit quality.
Nagy (2014) measures the change in audit clients following a Part II report by subtracting
the clients gained from the clients lost. While firms with public quality control criticisms lost more
clients than they gained, they are still able to attract new clients following the Part II report. It is
assumed that clients prefer reputable auditors that can increase the credibility of their financial
statements. This preference is consistent with the majority of companies switching auditors
following a negative PCAOB inspection report. Nevertheless, it appears that at least some clients
prefer auditors who receive public Part II reports. Our research objective is to examine the group
of clients that switch to auditors following a Part II report in order to better understand why these
companies would prefer an auditor with non-remediated quality control criticisms.
Recent literature has examined why companies may wish to retain an auditor following the
issuance of a Part II report. Johnson (2015) provides evidence that companies choosing to retain a
Part II report auditor negotiate lower audit fees while gaining higher audit quality. However,
additional analyses indicate that these results are only applicable to annually inspected firms and
not to the clients of the triennially inspected firms. Carlisle et al. (2017) provide evidence
suggesting that companies with higher agency costs are less likely to retain a triennially inspected
auditor with public quality control criticisms. Our study aims to add to this line of literature by
performing a deeper examination into the demand for triennial auditors with public Part II reports.
Prior literature focuses on the client decision of whether to retain an auditor that recently received
a public Part II report. Our study, however, investigates the group of clients that are actively
choosing to switch to auditors that recently received a Part II report. By examining the group of
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companies that switch to auditors with revealed quality control issues, we can better understand
why these companies are attracted to auditors with Part II reports. Per prior literature, we posit two
possible explanations for why companies would choose to switch to auditors with quality control
criticisms publicly reported by the PCAOB: 1) companies are identifying and switching to auditors
with Part II reports in response to preferences for a lower quality audit and/or 2) companies are
selecting Part II report auditors to obtain discounted audit fees.
Low Audit Quality
Companies may switch to auditors with revealed quality control criticisms because they
prefer a low-quality audit. Prior literature provides evidence that auditors with quality control
criticisms are associated with lower audit quality. Aobdia (2017) uses proprietary data from the
PCAOB and provides evidence of a negative association between non-public quality control
deficiencies and audit quality for large, annually inspected audit firms. Carlisle et al. (2017) find
that smaller, triennially inspected audit firms with public Part II reports provide lower audit quality
than audit firms that have remediated quality control deficiencies in a timely manner (i.e., those
that avoided a public Part II report).
Companies with poor internal controls or low financial reporting quality may prefer a lowquality auditor that may not obtain sufficient appropriate evidence or may be more likely to support
management’s preferred accounting treatment. Regulators and researchers have expressed
concerns over companies “opinion shopping,” which refers to a company searching for an audit
opinion that is consistent with management’s preferences (Lennox 2000; Newton et al. 2016;
PCAOB 2011). As mentioned above, audit firms have twelve months to address the quality control
criticism(s) noted by the inspection team before the Part II findings are made public. In the
inspections of triennial auditors from 2007-2010, approximately 90% of the audit firms with
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quality control criticisms remediated the deficiencies and avoided public Part II report disclosures
(PCAOB 2013). Therefore, public Part II reports could also be indicative of poor leadership or
tone at the top at the audit firm (Carlisle 2017). Companies may be aware that the Part II report
auditors lack the proper leadership to remediate quality controls in a timely manner, making the
auditor more susceptible to concede to the companies’ preferred accounting treatment or to issue
a more favorable audit opinion than would otherwise be merited.
Additionally, triennially inspected audit firms receiving Part II inspection reports are likely
focused on client retention due to an overall loss of clients. As noted above, audit firms lose a
significant portion of their market share following a Part II inspection report (Nagy 2014). Prior
research demonstrates that auditor competition and a strong emphasis on client retention can lead
to lower quality audits. Newton, Wang, and Wilkins (2013) provide evidence that restatements are
more likely to occur in metropolitan statistical areas with higher auditor competition. These
findings suggest that auditors in areas with higher competition may be improving efficiency at the
cost of effectiveness to retain clients. Companies switching to auditors with a Part II report may
represent a large portion of the audit firm’s client portfolio due to their overall loss of clients. This
higher economic dependence is yet another reason that companies may feel that they have a higher
likelihood of gaining auditor support with their preferred accounting treatment.
This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Companies that switch to triennially inspected auditors with Part II inspection
reports have lower audit quality than companies that switch to triennially inspected
auditors without Part II inspection reports.
Discounted Audit Fees
Companies may switch to auditors with quality control criticisms to negotiate discounted
audit fees in addition or instead of a preference for low audit quality. Auditors with Part II
inspection reports may accept lower fees to build their client base. In fact, prior evidence shows
20

that all auditors, not just those with reputational damages, are likely to earn less on initial
engagements. DeAngelo (1981) explains that low balling occurs on initial engagements because
auditors are competitive and seek to gain clients with the expectation of earning subsequent audit
fees on future engagements that will outweigh initial costs. Empirical evidence supports this
supposition, demonstrating price reductions when clients switch firms for the initial engagement
year and the next two fiscal years, with fees returning to normal levels around year four (Simon
and Francis 1988). Turpen (1990), as well as Ettredge and Greenberg (1990), report similar
findings of fee discounting even after adding necessary control variables such as auditor
characteristics. These fee discounts increase as more auditors bid on an engagement (Ettredge and
Greenberg 1990).
Building on these studies examining price reductions in initial engagement years, Ghosh
and Lustgarten (2006) demonstrate that this fee cutting practice is prevalent among non-Big 4
firms but less common for Big 4 firms. The authors explain that these results are likely a function
of the market and the fact that the smaller firms face greater competition. Huang et al. (2009)
examine the impact of SOX on fee reductions in the initial year of the audit. As this legislation
was designed to increase auditor conservatism, require audit committee oversight of audit hiring
and fee decisions, and add audit testing surrounding internal controls over financial reporting, the
authors posit that low balling will be less likely in a post-SOX environment. Findings support their
predictions as it relates to Big 4 audit firms. Big 4 auditors were likely to cut fees in 2001 prior to
SOX and charge a fee premium in 2006 following SOX requirements. However, consistent with
Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), there is no evidence that initial fee discounting diminishes in the
post-SOX period for non-Big 4 auditors. A more recent study has examined fee discounting in an
expanded post-SOX period (2007-2010). Desir, Casterella, and Kokina (2014) find evidence

21

suggesting that SOX curbed low balling, but that the impact was not long-lasting. In their sample,
both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, offer fee discounts for initial year engagements ranging from
16 to 34 percent.
Taken together, the prior research provides evidence that clients receive audit fee discounts
in the initial engagement year, especially when switching to a non-Big 4 firm. We hypothesize that
one reason companies switch to non-Big 4 firms that receive Part II inspection reports is to reduce
audit fees. In addition to the fee discount that can be obtained in an initial engagement year, these
companies may also expect a fee discount for the reduction in auditor reputation resulting from
the Part II inspection report. In a recent meta-analysis, evidence from multiple studies
demonstrates that higher audit quality, as measured by brand name (i.e. Big N) and whether the
auditor is a specialist, is associated with higher audit fees as these firms can earn a fee premium
for superior quality (Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
firms with reputational damage, especially those without the Big N brand name, are not able to
charge a fee premium and instead may need to reduce fees to attract clients. This discussion leads
to the following hypothesis:
H2: Companies that switch to triennially inspected auditors with Part II inspection
reports pay lower audit fees than companies that switch to triennially inspected auditors
without Part II inspection reports.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
Sample and Data Sources
To generate our sample, we first identify triennial auditors that have received a Part II
inspection report via the PCAOB website.1 We focus our attention on companies that switch to
smaller triennial auditors. Smaller audit firms don’t have the same brand recognition and
1

Our data set includes total of 1,605 inspections for 843 different triennial firms. Of these inspections, 151 resulted
in a public Part II PCAOB report for 125 different triennial firms, excluding repeat Part II reports.
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reputation as large, annually inspected firms, and are therefore more likely to be negatively
impacted by the PCAOB's reports than large firms (Abbott et al. 2013). Consequently, prior
research demonstrates that inspection reports are a signal of audit quality for these smaller firms
(Abbott et al. 2013; Nagy 2014).
Next, we isolate our sample to 247 companies that engaged a triennial auditor within two
years of the issuance of a Part II inspection report using Audit Analytics. 2 We combine data from
Audit Analytics with financial reporting data from Compustat. Because we are interested in
smaller companies, not all data were included in the Compustat database. Therefore, it was
necessary to hand collect missing information from the respective clients’ 10-K filings obtained
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and
Retrieval (EDGAR) database. To do this, we compiled a list of companies in our sample that had
at least one missing data item and had two assistants attempt to manually locate all the 10-K's from
EDGAR and fill in the missing data. When they finished, they compared all items they added to
the data set and worked out any differences between the two collections with the authors.
The clients that switched to a triennially inspected auditor within two years of receiving a
public Part II inspection report are matched to a control group of clients that switched to auditors
without a public Part II inspection report. We use propensity score matching, and match companies
on size,3 industry (two digit sic), and year. Companies with missing data and those without a
successful match are eliminated from our sample. Because the earliest publicly available Part II
inspection report dates back to 2005, our final sample includes companies that switched auditors

2

All companies in our sample switched from a triennial auditor to the Part II report triennial auditor except for nine
companies that switched from an annual auditor to the Part II report triennial auditor. Excluding these nine
companies does not impact our results.
3
We used total assets to match on size, where matched companies had to be within +/- 90% of the total assets of the
matched firm.
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between 2006 and 2013: 108 companies that switched to Part II report auditors and 79 companies
in the matched sample that switched to non-Part II report auditors. 4 The difference in sample size
between the sample of interest and the match is due to a lack of firms meeting the matching criteria
in Compustat (switching auditors, size, industry and year). Excluding the companies who switched
to a Part II report auditor that could not be matched with another company does not change the
statistical conclusions presented in the results. Of these 187 switches, the previous auditor resigned
in 48 cases and was dismissed in the remaining 139 instances. Excluding the 48 cases in which the
previous auditor resigned, as well as including this as a control variable in our models below, does
not alter the inferences suggested by our results.
Model Specification
Audit Quality Model
We regress discretionary accruals, our proxy for audit quality, on an indicator variable
measuring whether companies switched to a Part II inspection report auditor (SWITCHPARTII) to
test H1, which predicts that companies switch to these auditors to obtain lower audit quality.
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the Kothari et al. (2005) performance adjusted model. 5
Below is our empirical model:
ABSACCRUALSi,t+1 = β0 + β1 LNATi,t+1 + β2 CFOi,t+1 + β3 LOSSi,t+1 + β4 DEBTi,t+1 +
β5 SWITCHPARTII + ε

where:
ABSACCRUALS = absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals
of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)

4

While this study focuses on switches within two years of Part II report issuances, 100 of the 187 companies have
another change in auditors. Companies switch from the Part II report auditor to another auditor after an average of
858 days, or roughly 2.5 years. Compared to other companies that have switched auditors in the database, this time
period is slightly longer.
5
Consistent with Francis and Yu (2009), accruals are winsorized at a value of 1. ROI is also winsorized at -1 and 1
due to outliers.
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LNAT = natural log of total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of
auditor switch (time t)
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets of company i one year
subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
LOSS = 1 if company i reported a loss one year subsequent to year of auditor switch
(time t)
DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of
auditor switch (time t)
SWITCHPARTII = 1 if company i switched to an auditor receiving a Part II
inspection report within two years, 0 otherwise
The control variables are based on DeFond and Zhang’s (2014) review on audit quality.
We use common control variables for size (LNAT), leverage (DEBT), loss (LOSS), and operating
cash flow (CFO). However, we exclude other common control variables because they are not as
applicable to this context, it would further restrict our sample size, or risk over specification of the
model.
Audit Fee Model
We regress audit fees on the same indicator variable measuring whether companies
switched to a Part II inspection report auditor to test H2, which predicts that companies are
switching to these auditors to obtain discounted audit fees. In our initial model, all variables are
measured the year subsequent to the switch in auditors. Consistent with prior literature pertaining
to audit fees, we have included several control variables. Below is our empirical model adapted
from Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2016):
LNAUDFEE i,t+1 = β0 + β1 LNATi,t+1 + β2 GOINGCONi,t+1 + β3 QUICKi,t+1 + β4 DEBTi,t+1
+ β5 ROIi,t+1 + β6 LOSSi,t+1 + β7 FOREIGNi,t+1 + β8 DECYEi + β9 SWITCHPARTII + ε

where:
LNAUDFEE = the natural log of audit fees for company i one year subsequent to
year of auditor switch (time t)
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LNAT = the natural log of total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of
auditor switch (time t)
GOINGCON = 1 if company i received a going concern opinion one year
subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0 otherwise
QUICK = current assets less inventories divided by current liabilities for company
i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets for company i one year subsequent to year of
auditor switch (time t)
ROI = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets for company i one
year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
LOSS = 1 if company i reported a loss one year subsequent to year of auditor switch
(time t), 0 otherwise
FOREIGN = 1 if company i has income from foreign operations one year
subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0 otherwise
DECYE = 1 if the company i has a December year-end, 0 otherwise
SWITCHPARTII =1 if company i switched to an auditor receiving a Part II
inspection report within two years, 0 otherwise
IV. RESULTS
Table 2-1 provides the univariate statistics for each of the variables, split between
companies that switched to Part II report auditors and our control sample of companies that
switched to non-Part II report auditors. Comparisons of the means between the two groups
demonstrate that companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher levels of
discretionary accruals (ABSACCRUALS, p < 0.01) and pay lower audit fees as measured by the
natural log of audit fees (LNAUDFEE, p <0.01). We find a significant difference in our proxy for
company size, the natural log of total assets (LNAT). Companies that switch to Part II report
auditors tend to be smaller than those that switch to non-Part II report auditors. Also, the groups
are significantly different in the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion (GOINGCON)
and having a December fiscal year-end (DECYE), both of which are included as controls in
subsequent analyses. Companies that switch to Part II report auditors are more likely to receive a
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going concern opinion, which is likely because, in our sample, they are smaller and more likely to
have a loss than companies that do not switch to Part II report auditors. Overall, the univariate
results identify the characteristics of companies that hire low quality auditors, as assessed by the
receipt of a Part II report. They tend to be very small companies with poor financial performance—
companies which would benefit from engaging auditors who would allow them to present a more
favorable financial position or which would benefit from lower audit fees.
[Insert Table 2-1 here]
Table 2-2 reports the results from our discretionary accrual model to test H1, examining
whether companies switch to auditors with Part II reports to obtain a lower quality audit. Our
indicator variable, SWITCHPARTII, measuring whether companies switched to an auditor with a
Part II report, is positively and significantly associated with absolute discretionary accruals
(β=0.16, p=0.006). This provides evidence that companies that switch to Part II report auditors
have higher levels of discretionary accruals in the financial statements immediately following the
switch than companies that switch to auditors without a Part II report. The first hypothesis is
supported. The results suggest that companies may switch to auditors with Part II reports because
they permit higher levels of discretionary accruals. This may indicate a revealed preference for
low audit quality. We note that one control variable in our model, LNAT, is significant, indicating
that larger companies in our sample are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals.
[Insert Table 2-2 here]
We examine the difference in discretionary accruals for the fiscal year ended before the
switch, untabulated, to provide additional evidence that it is the new auditor that impacted audit
quality and not the financial reporting characteristics of the company. We do not find a significant
difference (p=.86) in absolute discretionary accruals prior to the switch, supporting our findings
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that audit quality is lower for companies that switch to auditors receiving a part II report. This
provides support that the effect is most likely caused by the combination of clients’ preferences
for low quality and the switch to an auditor that has been identified by the PCAOB as providing
lower quality audits.
Table 2-3 displays the results from the audit fee regression models used to test H2,
examining whether companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports are able to negotiate
lower fees compared to those that switch to triennials without a Part II report. Panel A provides
regression results with the natural log of audit fees (LNAUDFEE) as the dependent variable. Our
main test variable, SWITCHPARTII, has a negative coefficient but the association is not significant
at conventional levels. One control variable, LNAT, is significant in this model. These findings
suggest that larger companies (LNAT) are associated with higher audit fees. Table 2-3, Panel B
represents a model with the change in audit fees from the prior auditor to the new auditor
(CHGAUDFEE) as the dependent variable.6 We find similar results with the audit fee change
model in that our test variable, SWITCHPARTII, is not significant. While our univariate statistics
suggest that companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports pay lower audit fees than
companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, our multivariate regressions demonstrate
that once control variables are introduced, this association is no longer significant.
[Insert Table 2-3 here]
Lastly, we test the effect of switching to an auditor receiving a part II inspection report on
audit quality and fees using a ‘difference in difference’ analysis with our matched sample. This
test uses each company as its own control to rule out other factors which might affect audit quality
or fees. Our findings are consistent with those documented above. Specifically, Panel A of Table

6

FOREIGN is removed from the model in Panel B as there are no foreign firms in the sample.
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2-4 shows the difference in difference of 0.23 is significant (p=0.01), suggesting that audit quality
is significantly lower for companies that switch to a firm who recently received a Part II, relative
to those companies who switched to a firm who did not recently received a Part II inspection report.
In our sample, companies that switch to auditors with a Part II report have an increase in absolute
discretionary accruals in the first financial statements filed after the switch, whereas companies
switching to auditors with a Part II report have a decrease in accruals. Panel B provides the results
of the difference in difference test for audit fees and does not find a significant difference. Overall,
the difference in difference tests demonstrate the robustness of our findings.
[Insert Table 2-4 here]
V. CONCLUSION
The PCAOB's Part II inspection reports describe systematic quality control criticisms and
are a major focus of the inspection process (PCAOB 2015b). These findings are more pervasive
audit firm issues than those findings related to specific engagements described in Part I reports.
Part II findings only become public if firms fail to correct issues in a timely manner. Therefore, it
is not surprising that clients find these reports to be informative and a signal of low audit quality.
Nagy (2014) suggests that most companies desire high audit quality and avoid Part II audit firms;
however, his results provide evidence that some companies switch to these Part II audit firms. We
extend this line of literature by examining the group of companies that switch to auditors that have
recently received a Part II PCAOB report. We hypothesize that companies switch to Part II report
auditors in preference for a low-quality audit and/or discounted audit fees.
We find that the companies which hire auditors following the receipt of their Part II report
tend to be very small with poor financial performance. Our results suggest that in the first financial
period following the switch, these companies are associated with lower audit quality, as measured
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by discretionary accruals compared to a matched sample of other small firms who switch to a
triennial auditor without a Part II report. We fail to find evidence that companies that switch to
Part II auditors are able to negotiate a reduction in audit fees once control variables are considered.
Instead of switching to other audit firms without quality control criticisms, our analyses suggest
that some companies are choosing to switch to auditors with these Part II issues in preference for
a lower quality audit, not a reduction in audit fees. Thus, it appears that the PCAOB's Part II
inspection reports may be used as a signal of audit quality as proposed by the PCAOB's Audit
Quality Indicator (AQI) project (PCAOB 2015a). However, this signal may have the unintended
consequence of attracting some companies to lower quality auditors.
The results should be interpreted in light of various limitations of this study. Our sample
contains small companies that are audited by triennially inspected auditors. Consequently, we had
to hand collect data from companies missing necessary information that was not available in
databases. The small data set also restricts the number of control variables that we can include in
our models to avoid oversaturation. Lastly, the extent to which our results can be generalized to
companies that are not switching to triennially inspected auditors is unknown and should be
examined by future research.
Despite these limitations, this study extends the literature relating to whether the PCAOB's
inspection reports signal audit quality by focusing on a sample of companies that has not been
previously examined; namely, those that switch to auditors with public quality control criticisms.
The results should be of interest to regulators as the evidence demonstrates that not all companies
respond to negative inspection reports in the same manner. While many companies prefer high
quality audits, our analyses suggest that at least some are attracted to auditors with negative
inspection reports in preference for a lower quality audit.
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TABLE 2-1:
Descriptive Statistics

Non-Part II Auditor Switch
Variable
ABSACCRUALS
CFO
LOSS
DEBT
AT
LNAT
AUDFEE
LNAUDFEE
GOINGCON
QUICK
ROI
FOREIGN
DECYE
CHGAUDFEES
CHGAT
CHGQUICK
CHGDEBT
CHGROI

n
79
79
79
79
79
79
76
76
79
79
79
79
79
75
79
77
57
79

mean
0.39
-1.48
0.76
27.62
17.41
0.87
0.09
-2.90
0.62
9.34
-0.43
0.08
0.73
0.42
3.67
5.53
4.92
45.62

Std
0.39
2.53
0.43
173.70
36.47
2.46
0.07
1.10
0.49
25.03
0.50
0.27
0.44
1.42
21.11
21.89
28.20
441.50

Part II Auditor Switch
n
109
100
109
100
100
100
100
100
109
108
109
109
109
95
109
103
20
101

mean
0.66
-12.16
0.83
103.60
11.56
-1.15
0.05
-3.55
0.83
4.51
-0.38
0.01
0.22
1.01
162.50
94.21
851.80
9.89

std
0.39
147.00
0.37
529.90
41.31
3.35
0.05
1.05
0.38
22.10
3.14
0.10
0.42
3.87
1026.10
806.80
3815.00
531.20

Difference
t Value
-4.75
0.65
-1.28
-1.10
1.00
4.49
4.22
4.02
-3.24
1.39
-0.15
2.41
8.12
-1.26
-1.37
-0.96
-1.90
0.75

Pr > |t|
<0.01
0.52
0.20
0.27
0.32
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.00
0.16
0.88
0.02
<0.01
0.21
0.17
0.34
0.06
0.46

Variable Definitions:
absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals of company i one year subsequent to year
ABSACCRUALS
of auditor switch (time t)
cash flow from operations scaled by total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor
CFO
switch (time t)
LOSS
1 if company i reported a loss one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0 otherwise
DEBT
ratio of debt to total assets for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
AT
The total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
LNAT
the natural log of total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
AUDFEE
the audit fees for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
LNAUDFEE
the natural log of audit fees for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
1 if company i received a going concern opinion one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0
GOINGCON
otherwise
current assets less inventories divided by current liabilities for company i one year subsequent to year of
QUICK
auditor switch (time t)
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets for company i one year subsequent to year of
ROI
auditor switch (time t)
1 if company i has income from foreign operations one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time
FOREIGN
t), 0 otherwise
DECYE
1 if the company i has a December year-end, 0 otherwise
CHGAUDFEES
the percentage change in audit fees from previous auditor to new auditor
CHGAT
the percentage change in total assets from previous auditor to new auditor
CHGQUICK
variable QUICK for the new auditor divided by QUICK from previous auditor
CHGDEBT
variable DEBT for the new auditor divided by DEBT from previous auditor
CHGROI
variable ROI for the new auditor divided by ROI from previous auditor
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TABLE 2-2:
Audit Quality Model: Regression Results
Model:
ABSACCRUALS = β0 + β1 LNAT + β2 CFO + β3 LOSS + β4 DEBT + β5 SWITCHPARTII + ε
Variable

Intercept
LNAT
CFO
LOSS
DEBT
SWITCHPARTII

Prediction

Estimated
Coefficients

+

0.43
-0.05
0.00
0.01
-0.00
0.16

t-statistics

5.71***
-4.87***
1.21
0.18
-1.09
2.81***

Number of Observations
179
R2
23.9%
**, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively
Variable Definitions:
ABSACCRUALS = absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals of company i one year
subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
LNAT = the natural log of total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor
switch (time t)
LOSS = 1 if company i reported a loss one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
SWITCHPARTII = 1 if company i switched to an auditor receiving a Part II inspection report within two years, 0

otherwise
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TABLE 2-3:
Audit Fee Model: Regression Results
Panel A: Results with LNAUDFEE as the Dependent Variable
Model: LNAUDFEE = β0 + β1 LNAT + β2 GOINGCON + β3 QUICK + β4 DEBT + β5 ROI + β6 LOSS

+ β7FOREIGN + β8 DECYE+ β9 SWITCHPARTII + ε
Variable

Intercept
LNAT
GOINGCON
QUICK
DEBT
ROI
LOSS
FOREIGN
DECYE
SWITCHPARTII

Prediction

+

Estimated
Coefficients
-3.35
0.29
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.19
-0.19
0.51
0.32
-0.14

t-statistics
-3.35***
0.29***
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.19
-0.19
0.51
0.32
-0.14

Number of Observations
102
R2
44.0%
*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively
Variable Definitions:
LNAUDFEE = the natural log of audit fees for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
LNAT = the natural log of total assets of company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
GOINGCON = 1 if company i received a going concern opinion one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0
otherwise
QUICK = current assets less inventories divided by current liabilities for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch
(time t)
DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t)
ROI = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets for company i one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time
t)
LOSS = 1 if company i reported a loss one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0 otherwise
FOREIGN = 1 if company i has income from foreign operations one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0
otherwise
DECYE = 1 if the company i has a December year-end, 0 otherwise
SWITCHPARTII =1 if company i switched to an auditor receiving a Part II inspection report within two years, 0 otherwise

36

TABLE 2-3 (continued)
Panel B: Results with CHGAUDFEES as the Dependent Variable
Model: CHGAUDFEES = β0 + β1 CHGAT + β2 GOINGCON + β3 CHGQUICK + β4 CHGDEBT

+ β5 CHGROI + β6 LOSS + β7 DECYE+ β8 SWITCHPARTII + ε
Variable
Intercept
CHGAT
GOINGCON
CHGQUICK
CHGDEBT
CHGROI
LOSS
DECYE
SWITCHPARTII

Prediction

+

Estimated
Coefficients
1.57
0.01
0.08
-0.00
-0.01
-0.00
-0.40
-0.17
0.20

t-statistics
6.42***
0.58
0.34
- 0.07
-0.61
0.01
-1.56
-0.82
0.33

Number of Observations
65
2
R
10.7%
*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively
Variable Definitions:
CHGAUDFEES = the percentage change in audit fees from previous auditor to new auditor
CHGAT = the percentage change in total assets from previous auditor to new auditor
GOINGCON = 1 if firm received a going concern opinion one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0 otherwise
CHGQUICK = variable QUICK for the new auditor divided by QUICK from previous auditor.
CHGDEBT = variable DEBT for the new auditor divided by DEBT from previous auditor.
CHGROI= variable ROI for the new auditor divided by ROI from previous auditor.
LOSS = 1 if company i reported a loss one year subsequent to year of auditor switch (time t), 0 otherwise
DECYE = 1 if the company has a December year-end, 0 otherwise
SWITCHPARTII = 1 if company i switched to an auditor receiving a Part II inspection report within two years, 0 otherwise
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TABLE 2-4:
Difference in Difference Tests
Panel A: Change in Discretionary Accruals (n=328)

Non-Part II Auditor Switch
mean (std) [n]
Part II Auditor Switch
mean (std) [n]

INTERCEPT
POST
SWITCHPARTII
POST*SWITCHPARTII

Pre
0.59
(0.42)
[73]
0.60
(0.44)
[91]

Post
0.39
(0.39)
[73]
0.63
(0.39)
[91]

Difference

Difference in
Difference

-0.20
0.03

0.23
(p=0.01)

Difference in Difference Results
Estimated Coefficient
t-statistic
0.63
14.67***
-0.03
-0.49
-0.23
-3.62
0.22
2.58**

Panel B: Change in Natural Log of Audit Fees (n=310)
Non-Part II Auditor Switch
mean (std) [n]
Part II Auditor Switch
mean (std) [n]

INTERCEPT
POST
SWITCHPARTII
POST*SWITCHPARTII

Pre
-2.97
(1.23)
[66]
-3.74
(1.59)
[89]

Post
-2.89
(1.10)
[66]
-3.53
(1.05)
[89]

Difference

Difference in
Difference

0.08
0.21

0.13
(p=0.31)

Difference in Difference Results
Estimated Coefficient
t-statistic
-3.51
-26.20***
-0.22
-1.97*
0.59
2.89**
0.14
0.83

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively
Note: Variable Post signifies the difference between the year before and after the switch.
SWITCHPARTII is 1 if the company switched to an auditor receiving a Part II inspection report
within two years, 0 otherwise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to auditor turnover, changes in client timing, and other unforeseen circumstances,
accounting firms are sometimes required to substitute auditors during audit engagements. Auditor
turnover in public accounting occurs frequently (Hall and Smith 2009) and client readiness is a
common issue for auditors (Bobek, Daugherty, and Radtke 2012). These scenarios create
scheduling changes that may require accounting firms to add resources to meet client needs and
established deadlines. Regulators have noted that excessive turnover on audit engagements may
harm audit quality (PCAOB 2015). As such, this study explores whether substitute auditors
complete the end of a task with the same diligence as auditors completing the entire task from start
to finish.
To complete the task, essential information must be transferred to substitute auditors.
While the key details of the task are documented in the workpapers and may be easy to transfer,
not all evidence is easily transferable. Professional skepticism has been described as an attitude or
mindset (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2013; Nelson 2009; PCAOB 2012). It may be difficult to articulate and
even more difficult to transfer to substitute auditors. Due to recent audit failures resulting from the
lack of appropriate skepticism (PCAOB 2011), accounting literature has focused on the factors
that may influence skeptical judgment and action (e.g., Bowlin et al. 2015; Brazel et al. 2016;
Carpenter and Reimers 2013; Hurtt et al. 2013; Messier et al. 2010; Nelson 2009; Quadackers et
al. 2014; Trompeter et al. 2013). However, the literature has yet to consider whether substitute
auditors are less skeptical than auditors completing a task from start to finish.
There are two reasons why substitute auditors may not be as skeptical. First, substitute
auditors may be less skeptical than an auditor completing a task from start to finish because the
previous auditor did not transfer all the necessary information. Second, substitute auditors may not
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feel as vested in the task. Task Identity, a dimension from the Job Characteristics Model, pertains
to the degree in which a job is completed from start to finish (Hackman and Oldham 1976). If a
substitute auditor finishes a task that was already started by someone else, he/she will have lower
task identity; whereas, an auditor that completes a task from start to finish will have higher task
identity. Prior research indicates that higher task identity can lead to an increase in performance
due to greater feelings of psychological ownership (Downey 2017; Pierce et al. 2009) and
meaningfulness (Hackman and Oldham, 1976). Therefore, it is possible that a substitute auditor
with lower task identity may not exercise appropriate skepticism due to lower feelings of
meaningfulness and ownership.
We investigate whether auditors finishing a portion of a task are less skeptical in their
judgment and actions as compared to auditors completing an entire task from start to finish. We
also explore whether substitute auditors are less skeptical because they lack information or higher
task identity. Lastly, we examine if an increase in accountability may resolve this potential issue.
Per practitioners, performance evaluations are completed for auditors that work a certain number
of hours on an engagement; this threshold ranged from 40-80 hours, depending on the firm. If the
substitute auditor does not meet the hour requirement to receive an evaluation, it is possible that
the auditor will feel even less obligated to exercise a sufficient level of professional skepticism.
Prior studies illustrate that when accountable to a supervisor who encourages an attitude of
skepticism, auditors tend to increase skeptical behavior (Carpenter and Reimers 2013; Turner
2001). Performance evaluations may increase the feeling of ownership and attenuate the influence
of lower task identity on skepticism.
We use an experimental design to investigate the influence of auditor substitution on
skeptical judgment and action. Sixty-two practicing accountants were recruited as participants to
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role-play as auditors. They completed an accounts receivable confirmation test adapted from
Bennett and Hatfield (2013). Several red flags were added to the case to induce skepticism. Results
suggest that substitute auditors were less skeptical of the controller’s honesty than those who
completed the entire task. Additionally, substitute auditors requested less audit evidence relative
to auditors that completed the task from start to finish. Analysis of the notes that were received by
substitute auditors reveals that only 32% made mention of the controller disagreeing with the audit
approach. Mediation tests indicate that substitute auditors not receiving information about the
controller disagreement were less skeptical of the controller’s honesty. This lower level of
skeptical judgment then led to fewer evidence requests when completing the task. Findings did not
support that substitute auditors felt a lower sense of psychological ownership and meaningfulness
resulting in lower skepticism. Taken together, our results suggest that skepticism is lower among
substitute auditors due to a lack of information as opposed to feelings associated with lower task
identity.
These findings contribute to the stream of accounting literature that has considered initial
engagement resource allocation decisions (e.g., Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; O’Keefe et al.
1994; Stein et al. 1994) by investigating the influence of scheduling changes once the audit begins.
Additionally, this study contributes to the literature pertaining to task identity (e.g., Downey 2017;
Hackman and Oldham 1976; Humphrey et al. 2007; Pierce et al. 2009) by demonstrating that while
lower task identity has been shown to harm performance, it does not appear to influence
skepticism. The findings should be of interest to auditors and regulators as they highlight one
potential barrier of professional skepticism. Audit evidence that influences skepticism but is not
directly related to the task may be more difficult to transfer. If substitute auditors do not receive
this information, they may be less skeptical in their judgment, and as a result, request less audit
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evidence. These results have practical implications for audit firms. Policies surrounding the
transfer of information to substitute auditors should be implemented or reviewed. If substitute
auditors effectively receive all information, it may help to keep established skepticism intact when
tasks are transferred.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II presents the relevant
literature and hypothesis development, section III discusses the research method, section IV
reports the results, and section V offers a conclusion.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Audit Planning, Engagement Team Staffing, and Potential Changes
Audit Standard (AS) 2101 provides guidance for developing an overall audit strategy and
an audit plan to execute the established strategy (PCAOB 2010). Although the standard indicates
that the audit partner is ultimately responsible for planning the engagement, many of the planning
activities, such as assessing compliance with independence regulations, gaining an understanding
of the client’s business, and evaluating risk, are typically performed by the audit senior and audit
manager (Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; Houston 1999). A critical output of these planning
procedures is the time budget for the engagement. Houston (1999) describes the process of creating
a time budget, which includes dividing the audit into the various audit sections (e.g., cash, accounts
receivable, debt, accounts payable, etc.) and estimating an approximate time budget per section
after consideration of the overall audit strategy and risk of material misstatement in each area.
The time budget can then be used as a tool to determine the appropriate staffing.
Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) demonstrate that client size, industry, and risk are associated
with resource allocation decisions (e.g., more manager than in-charge time is spent on planning
tasks when the client is a public entity). Additional studies have examined the impact of other
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factors, including auditor tenure and reliance on internal controls, on the labor mix allocated to
audit engagements (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Stein et al. 1994). While past research has explored the
nature of initial resource allocation decisions, it has not yet examined the staffing changes that are
made during an audit.
As information relating to audit staffing is limited in the prior literature, interviews with
two audit managers, two human resource employees responsible for scheduling audit
engagements, and an audit partner who had oversight responsibilities relating to scheduling were
insightful in gaining a better understanding of how this process occurs in practice. 7 These five
individuals provided perspectives from four separate audit firms, ranging from regional firms to
Big 4 firms. Discussions corroborated prior research in that the scheduling process stems from the
time budget by audit area. Typically, the audit manager reviews and/or prepares the budget by
audit area and determines which staff have the necessary skills and experience to work on the audit
engagement. When selecting auditors to participate on the engagement, the manager generally
considers the auditing, industry, and client expertise that the individual can provide the team. The
audit manager then contacts the appropriate employee in human resources to process the necessary
scheduling requests. This individual will “block off” the appropriate time for the auditors requested
in the scheduling system. Scheduling begins well in advance, often several months to a year prior
to the audit. Most of the firms have a resource in each local office, or at a minimum in each region,
that is administratively responsible for maintaining and updating auditor schedules.
While all agree that it is best for the auditors and their clients if audit teams stay intact
throughout the course of the audit, scheduling changes are sometimes unavoidable. One of the

7

Semi-structured interviews were conducted based on a set of questions that differed slightly depending on job title
(audit or human resources) and his/her role in auditor substitution. Interviews were all conducted via phone and
lasted between 20 – 60 minutes.
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audit managers explained, “. . . we do our best to carefully plan the audit, but you can’t plan for
the unknown.” This is not surprising given that AS 2101 expects auditors to update their strategy
and audit plan as necessary throughout the course of the audit engagement if risks of material
misstatement are detected after the planning phase (PCAOB 2010). Per the interview discussions,
common reasons for scheduling changes include: 1) circumstances that cause the audit team to fall
behind scheduled milestones, 2) auditor turnover, and 3) client timing changes.
Both audit managers discussed the need to review the time budget on a regular basis
throughout the audit. The managers compare the total budget with the time charged to-date to
determine if the remaining budget is sufficient, and if there will be any issues meeting the agreed
upon deadline. Dates for milestones, such as the completion of internal control testing and interim
procedures, are also established to keep the team on track to meet the final deadline. If the audit
manager notices that the team is falling behind schedule, additional resources may be added to
help the team catch-up. Auditors may be behind schedule because the client had an unexpected
large transaction, such as an acquisition, that requires additional audit work. Another reason relates
to the audit being more complex than anticipated. Lastly, if more discrepancies are found than
predicted, additional time will be needed to understand and appropriately deal with the issues.
Auditor turnover in public accounting is a continuing issue (Hall and Smith 2009). Of
course, it is always best if the auditor leaving the firm provides a two-week notice and can complete
as much of their current work as possible. However, depending on the timing, open items may
remain, and the future work scheduled for that auditor will need reassigned. The PCAOB includes
audit turnover as a potential audit quality indicator, and suggests that excessive turnover, including
auditors leaving the firm or being transferred to a different audit engagement within the firm, could
impair audit quality (PCAOB 2015).
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Lastly, it may be possible that the client is not prepared for an audit when it is originally
scheduled. If a significant business event occurs or the client loses a key accounting resource, they
may end up completing the financial statement close process later than anticipated. If the financial
records are not ready, this in turn delays the audit. This explanation provided during the interviews
is consistent with an experimental questionnaire investigating audit challenges; the most common
audit challenge self-reported by 46% of the participating professional auditors related to client
readiness issues (Bobek et al. 2012). Delaying an audit can create scheduling conflicts (e.g., an
auditor may be assigned to work on two clients at the same time), especially in busy season when
staff have very full schedules with multiple clients back-to-back. The individual responsible for
scheduling in human resources must work closely with the various audit managers in the office to
resolve these conflicts. One resource analyst expressed that creativity is sometimes required to
rearrange the schedule. Another interviewee suggested that it is most important to keep the
managers and seniors with the client and industry knowledge consistent; whereas, staff auditors
are easier to rotate as necessary.
If the scheduling issues discussed above occur, the audit manager must decide whether it
is best to shift unfinished work to another auditor already on the team or add a new auditor to the
engagement. Per the practitioners, it is preferred that an auditor starts and finishes their assigned
tasks before leaving the firm or to work on a different engagement within the firm. If an auditor is
leaving the firm, it varies as to whether they will leave open items within a task or complete it
entirely. If an auditor is leaving to work on a different engagement within the firm and has not
completed an assigned task, the manager has a little more control. However, it also varies as to
whether: 1) the auditor will juggle the uncompleted task and the new client assignment; 2) the
uncompleted task will be shifted to another team member; or 3) a new resource will be added to
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complete the task. The audit manager must weigh the circumstances and decide how it is best to
proceed. While staff and senior auditors do often juggle tasks on multiple clients, one of the
managers said that it is not uncommon for an existing team member to finish a few open items on
a task, so that the auditor can have a “clean break” and move on to their next engagement. As
situations arise that force auditors to deal with scheduling changes and the sharing of audit tasks,
it is important to understand how these circumstances impact auditor judgment and decision
making.
Professional Skepticism

While information documented in the audit workpapers is likely easy to transfer to
substitute auditors, other less tangible information may be more difficult to communicate.
Professional skepticism has been referred to as a mindset (Hurtt et al. 2013; Nelson 2009; PCAOB
2012) and may be more difficult to transfer. As such, this study will focus on the influence of
auditor substitution on skeptical judgment and action.
The term professional skepticism is mentioned throughout auditing standards and used
frequently by researchers, but there is not an agreed upon definition in the accounting literature.
Currently, there are two predominant perspectives, neutrality and presumptive doubt, on how to
consider and define skepticism (Nelson 2009). The neutrality point of view contends that auditors
take an objective and unbiased approach in reviewing management’s representations. Whereas,
the presumptive doubt position assumes that auditors believe that management is dishonest on
some level until evidence is provided to change this opinion (Nelson 2009; Quadackers et al.
2014).
In the Nelson model, professional skepticism is divided into two categories, skeptical
judgment and skeptical action. Skeptical judgment pertains to an auditor’s ability to identify a
potential discrepancy that requires additional follow-up procedures; whereas, skeptical action is
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the behavior that follows skeptical judgment (Nelson 2009). This study not only reviews the impact
of auditor substitution on skeptical judgment (the auditor’s assessment of the likelihood of material
misstatement, fraud, and that the controller is honest), but it also examines the impact on skeptical
action (the auditor’s choice whether to obtain information to corroborate management’s
explanation).
A lack of consistent and appropriately applied professional skepticism has been a recurring
theme in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) review activities (PCAOB
2012). Professional skepticism is not only an issue for auditors in the U.S., but international
auditing standard-setters are also emphasizing the importance of professional skepticism (IAASB
2012). Further, in a review of recent SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAERs) and PCAOB Disciplinary Proceedings (DPs) relating to the Engagement Quality
Reviewers (EQRs), Messier et al. (2010) noted that 22 of 28 cases cited a lack of sufficient
skepticism. As a result of recent audit inspections and research in the area, there is consensus that
it would be beneficial to find ways to raise the level of professional skepticism exercised by
auditors. One way to begin to address the problem is to better understand some of the potential
barriers to skepticism (Brazel et al. 2016). The current study seeks to identify another factor,
auditor substitution on audit engagements, which may hinder professional skepticism. We predict
that a substitute auditor will be less skeptical in their judgment and actions compared to auditors
that complete an entire task.
This discussion leads to the following overall hypotheses:
H1a: Individuals who complete a task already started by another auditor will be less
skeptical in their judgment than those who complete a task from start to finish.
H1b: Individuals who complete a task already started by another auditor will be less
likely to request additional audit evidence than those who completing a task from
start to finish.
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We expect substitute auditors to be less skeptical for two possible reasons: 1) the substitute
auditor may be lacking information, and 2) the substitute auditor may feel less ownership and
meaningfulness in the task.
Transfer of Information
In practice, the electronic workpaper(s) that need completed are sent to the substitute
auditor. The original auditor can leave comments within the workpaper(s) or have a conversation,
if possible, with the substitute auditor to communicate any information not already documented.
While the information directly related to the task is likely documented in the workpaper, it is not
clear whether the original auditor will also pass on other red flags noted that do not directly relate
to completing the task. Prior literature has stressed the importance of knowledge-sharing among
auditors because of the nature of team-based audits (Vera-Muñoz, Ho, and Chow 2006). Much of
the recent literature relating to knowledge-sharing in the audit context has focused on fraud
brainstorming as it is required by the audit standards (AU Section 316) for each engagement.
Knowledge pertaining to potential fraud risks is shared among the audit team in a group setting
during the planning phase of the audit (Brazel et al. 2010; Carpenter 2007). However, the literature
has yet to examine whether red flags are shared when transferring tasks from one auditor to
another. We expect that skepticism may be lower for substitute auditors due to the loss of pertinent
during the transfer.
This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H2a: Individuals who complete a task already started by another auditor will be less
skeptical in their judgment than those who complete a task from start to finish as a
result of missing information.
H2b: Individuals who complete a task already started by another auditor will be less
likely to request additional audit evidence than those who completing a task from
start to finish as a result of missing information.
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Task Identity
In addition to missing information, substitute auditors may be less skeptical because they
do not feel as vested in the task. The Job Characteristics Model (JCM), developed by Hackman
and Oldham (1976) using work design theory, specifies core dimensions that impact psychological
states, which ultimately increase positive personal and work outcomes. One key dimension in the
JCM relevant to the current study is task identity, which relates to the “degree to which the job
requires completion of a whole and identifiable piece of work; that is doing a job from beginning
to end with a visible outcome” (Hackman and Oldham 1976, 257). In a meta-analytic work design
study, the analyses demonstrated that task identity is positively related to positive work outcomes,
including job satisfaction, growth satisfaction, internal work motivation, job involvement, and
organizational commitment (Humphrey et al. 2007). In addition to these other positive outcomes,
we examine if auditors with higher task identity will also exercise more professional skepticism as
compared to auditors with lower task identity.
Recent research in accounting has considered the concept of task identity, but in a different
context than audit task sharing as a result of scheduling changes. Downey (2017) explores the
influence of outsourcing core audit work to offshore or domestic audit centers on audit quality.
The experimental results indicate that the local auditors responsible for completing a final portion
of an outsourced assignment had lower task identity, which resulted in lower audit performance.
The current study aims to extend this line of research by examining the impact of task identity on
the level of auditor skepticism.
The JCM includes psychological states that connect the core job dimensions to the positive
work outcomes. The original model specifies that task identity leads to positive work outcomes
via experienced meaningfulness in the task (Hackman and Oldham, 1976). However, a
modification of the JCM has been proposed to incorporate psychological ownership theory. “The
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core of psychological ownerships is the feeling of possessiveness and of being psychologically
tied to an object” (Pierce et al. 2001, 299). The purpose of this addition by Pierce and colleagues
is to provide a stronger, more parsimonious connection between the five job characteristics (task
identity, along with skill variety, task significance, autonomy, and feedback) and the positive work
outcomes identified by the Hackman and Oldham model. In a recent accounting study, Bauer,
Estep, and Griffith (2017) demonstrate that when a fair value specialist has higher psychological
ownership, he or she is more likely to identify issues and communicate these concerns more
urgently to the core audit team. The current study will extend the literature relating to
psychological ownership by examining the construct as a possible mediator between task identity
and skeptical judgment and action.
This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H3a: Individuals who complete a task already started by another auditor will be less
skeptical in their judgment than those who complete a task from start to finish as a
result of task identity.
H3b: Individuals who complete a task already started by another auditor will be less
likely to request additional audit evidence than those who completing a task from
start to finish as a result of task identity.
Accountability
In addition to the psychological ownership and meaningfulness that an auditor may feel as
a result of completing a task from start to finish, it is also probable that auditors consider the impact
of the particular task on their performance evaluations. During the interviews, professional
auditors reported that they are expected to receive performance evaluations for client engagements
in which they have worked a minimum number of hours. In the small sample of interviews, this
threshold ranged from 40 and 80 hours depending on the firm. Therefore, if a new auditor is
assigned to an engagement to complete a task that takes fewer hours than the established threshold
for an evaluation, the incentive to exercise skepticism may decrease. Additionally, an auditor from
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the existing engagement team may be asked to complete another auditor’s work and still expects
to receive an evaluation. The decrease in accountability is still likely as s/he will anticipate that
the evaluation will be focused primarily on their main assigned tasks and less on the tasks that they
are finalizing on behalf of someone else. Thus, an auditor will likely feel more accountable as a
result of the evaluation process when completing a task from start to finish.
Extant accounting literature demonstrates that an increase in accountability can lead to an
increase in effort and conservatism in judgment (see DeZoort, Harrison, and Taylor 2006 for a
review of the literature). Additionally, prior research demonstrates that there are varying levels of
accountability pressure, and feedback in the form of an evaluation on performance represents a
situation in which there is a high level of accountability pressure (DeZoort et al. 2006; Lerner and
Tetlock 1999). Prior accounting studies illustrate that auditors increase skeptical behavior when
accountable to a supervisor who encourages an attitude of skepticism (Carpenter and Reimers,
2013; Hurtt 2013; Turner 2001). Therefore, if the audit supervisor is supportive of skepticism,
increased accountability to that supervisor will likely lead to an increase in skeptical judgment and
actions by auditors. As our scenario does not include discussion relating to the cost of being more
skeptical (i.e., meeting a time budget) or a supervisor with emphasis on efficiency, it is likely that
participants will increase their skepticism in response to an increase in accountability.
This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H4a: When accountability is increased as a result of a performance evaluation, the
negative impact of lower task identity on skeptical judgment is attenuated.
H4b: When accountability is increased as a result of a performance evaluation, the
negative impact of lower task identity on skeptical action is attenuated.
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III. RESEARCH METHOD
Task
A one by three (entire task, portion of task with accountability, and portion of task without
accountability) between-subjects experimental design was used to test the above hypotheses.
Participants received instructions and case material via online materials. After consenting to
participate in the study, they read information about a hypothetical audit in which they were asked
to participate as a staff auditor on an engagement team. Participants were either asked to complete
accounts receivable (AR) confirmation testing from start to finish (entire task) or finish AR testing
that another auditor has already started (portion of task). The AR audit task was adapted from a
prior case used by Bennett and Hatfield (2013) and was selected as the audit task for several
reasons. First, regulators have specifically noted that reviewing confirmations for inconsistencies
is an area that requires professional skepticism (PCAOB 2012). Second, revenue recognition and
improper cut-off has been identified as a high-risk area (Hogan et al. 2008). Lastly, this is a task
that would be assigned to an audit staff with minimal prior experience, and according to initial
interviews, these auditors are more likely to be rotated between engagements and are most likely
to share tasks.
During the AR testing, several red flags were included during the task to promote auditor
skepticism. First, the AR aging schedule contains several material invoices aged past 90 days,
which is a relevant fraud risk factor that has been utilized in prior experiments (Carpenter 2007).
The AR detail also includes several large transactions right before the end of the accounting period.
Second, the invoice in question has a unique invoice number (#999999) that is out of sequence
with the other invoices. Third, participants experience a delay in obtaining the requested accounts
receivable information as a result of the company having to hire a new accounts receivable
manager. Participants will learn that the company has had significant turnover in the past few
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months. Lastly, when the request is made for the controller to sign the accounts receivable
confirmations, the controller asks why the auditors are sending confirmations instead of just testing
the balance analytically. These risk factors (significant and unusual transactions just before period
end, high turnover rates, and aggressive management behavior regarding the scope of the audit)
are all examples contained within auditing standard AU Section 316 (AICPA 2002).
Independent Variables
There are two main independent variables of interest, the amount of the task completed and
accountability. The amount of the task completed (the entire task or a portion of the task) was first
manipulated, and then accountability (whether a performance evaluation is expected) was
manipulated between the participants only completing a portion of the task. All participants in the
entire task condition expected to receive a performance evaluation as it would be uncommon in
practice to complete a task from start to finish, such as accounts receivable testing, and not meet
the hour requirement for an evaluation. These manipulations resulted in three experimental
conditions.
[Insert Figure 3-1]
The amount of the task completed (TASK) was randomly assigned between-subjects. The
first group of participants were assigned to complete the AR confirmation testing from start to
finish. They were asked to provide electronic notes for a substitute auditor approximately halfway
through the task in case they did not have time to complete the testing. After completing the
electronic notes, these participants were then told that their schedules were adjusted, and they had
time to complete the entire task. The second group of participants only completed the last portion
of the task. They were passed the electronic workpapers already started and notes from the
participants in the first group.
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Accountability (ACCOUNT), whether the participant expects to receive a performance
evaluation, was manipulated between subjects assigned to complete the last portion of the task.
Based on initial interviews, auditors receive performance evaluations after working a specified
number of hours on an engagement. The manipulation was developed based on this knowledge
and read as follows:
It is typical to work on more than one audit throughout the year. Auditors receive
performance evaluations for audit engagements in which he/she works over a specified
number of hours.
Per the audit supervisor’s estimation of the work you need to perform, you WILL (NOT)
receive a performance evaluation related to your work performed on the NTI audit.
Dependent Variables
Skeptical Judgment
Skeptical judgment was first assessed at the midpoint of the task (SKJUDGMENT_MID).
For the participants only completing the last portion of the task, skeptical judgment was assessed
after reviewing the work completed by the previous auditor and prior to completing their portion
of the task. For participants completing the entire task, skeptical judgment was assessed at the
same point in the task that the substitute auditor begins the assignment. Skeptical judgment was
measured by asking participants to assess the likelihood of three events: 1) that the accounts
receivable balance is materially misstated, 2) that fraudulent revenue transactions have been
recorded, and 3) that the client is honest. Responses were measured on seven-point Likert scales,
ranging from 1=extremely unlikely to 7=extremely likely. For all participants, skeptical judgment
was measured again using the same three questions at the conclusion of the task
(SKJUDGMENT_END) to determine the influence of the evidence obtained to complete the task
on auditor skepticism.
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Skeptical Action
Similar to the Bennett and Hatfield (2013) study, skeptical action (SKACTION) was
measured based on the audit actions taken during the last stage of the task. Participants were asked
to investigate a discrepancy between the client and customer balance on an accounts receivable
confirmation. Those assigned to complete the entire task, performed all accounts receivable testing
and investigated the discrepancy as the last step. Participants only completing the last portion of
the task reviewed the accounts receivable testing started by the previous auditor and completed the
testing by investigating the confirmation discrepancy.
To obtain all necessary evidence to properly explain the discrepancy, participants first had
the opportunity to ask the controller to explain discrepancy between their balance and the
customer’s balance. The controller then informs participants that the discrepancy pertains to an
order that was in-transit as of the end of the year (i.e. the goods were shipped from the client prior
to year-end and not received by the customer until after year-end), and as the shipping terms are
FOB shipping point, it was proper to recognize revenue. Next, the participants have the opportunity
to request copies of the invoice and shipping document to verify the goods were in fact in-transit.
Lastly, to corroborate the controller’s verbal statement relating to the shipping terms, the
participant can also request evidence (customer purchase order or contract) to verify the shipping
terms are in fact FOB shipping point. When additional requests were made, participants were
required to type an email to the controller requesting the evidence. This required participants to
invest time to obtain more information similar to requesting documentation in practice.
Participants were scored according to the number of additional inquires and document requests
made to the client. Scores range from 0 (no additional probing) to 4 (all possible additional requests
were made).
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Possible Mediating Variables
Information Transferred
The information transferred from the original auditor to the substitute auditor may
influence skepticism. As such, we analyzed the number of red flags (REDFLAGS) included in the
notes that are passed to substitute auditors to determine if the content of the notes influenced
skeptical judgment and skeptical action. There were six red flags included in the scenario.
Task Identity
Prior research demonstrates that psychological ownership (Pierce et al. 2009; Downey
2017) and meaningfulness (Hackman and Oldham 1976) may mediate the relationship between
task identity and performance. As such, psychological ownership and meaningfulness were
measured and assessed as potential mediators in the association between task identity and
skepticism.
Psychological Ownership
Psychological ownership was measured via the average of three questions adapted from
prior management and accounting studies (Bauer et al. 2017; Downey 2017; Van Dyne and Pierce
2004). Participants were asked to assess the extent to which they agree with the following three
statements relating to the sense of ownership they felt for the AR confirmation testing: 1) This is
my AR testing; 2) I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for the AR testing; and 3) I sense
that this is my work. Responses were measured on seven-point Likert scales, ranging from
1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.

Meaningfulness
Experienced meaningfulness of the task was measured using a two-question scale adapted
from prior management studies (Hackman and Oldham 1974). Participants were asked to assess
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the extent to which they agree with the following: 1) a statement that the AR confirmation testing
was useless or trivial; and 2) a statement that the AR confirmation testing was very meaningful.
Responses were measured on seven-point Likert scales, ranging from 1=strongly disagree to
7=strongly agree.
[Insert Table 3-1]
IV. RESULTS
Participants
Accounting professionals were recruited prior to the start of a CPE training session for a
regional accounting firm. Approximately one third of the participants were assigned to complete
the entire task and began the experiment the week prior to the training. We then used their actual
electronic notes to pass to the remaining two-thirds of the participants to finish the task. Half of
this group was assigned to complete the last portion of the task with accountability condition, while
the remainder were assigned to complete the last portion of the task without accountability. This
initial collection resulted in 48 completed responses. To supplement this collection, we also
recruited participants using personal connections on LinkedIn. Following the same procedures and
survey time-line, this collection resulted in another 14 participants, making our total sample 62
participants. To ensure that collection procedures did not influence the results, we included a
binary control variable in our analyses below to capture whether the participant was recruited for
the initial collection or follow-up collection.
As reported in Table 3-2, 20 of the participants (43%) currently work in the assurance
practice group at their firm. Participants had on average 15 years of work experience and were
relatively familiar with accounts receivable testing. The average familiarity of participants with
AR testing was reported to be 5.0 on a scale of 1 (not familiar) to 9 (very familiar). Lastly, in a
debriefing question, participants were asked if there were times when they were unable to complete
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a task from start to finish and if so, how often. On average, participants noted that they are unable
to complete 1-9% of their tasks from start to finish. This is consistent with preliminary interviews
in that the goal is for auditors to complete tasks all the way through. However, there are times
when scheduling conflicts and turnover prevent this from being possible and a substitute auditor
is required to complete a task.
[Insert Table 3-2]
Transfer of Notes
It was our intention to pass notes from each participant completing the entire task to one
participant completing only a portion of the task that was accountable and one participant
completing only a portion of the task that was not accountable. However, this matching procedure
was not completely possible due to participant turnover. Some of the participants assigned to
complete the entire task did not finish the experiment. They completed the first part of the accounts
receivable testing and typed notes for a substitute auditor but did not attend the CPE
session/respond to our second email request to complete the last portion of the testing. As there
was no way of knowing who would complete the entire experiment, notes from some participants
that did not complete the testing were passed to substitute auditors.
While this was not ideal, we believed that some mismatching was worth the sacrifice to
recruit professionals. To test whether this may influence our results, we compared the red flags
contained in the notes passed from the group that was assigned to complete the entire task
(although not all did) to the red flags in the notes received by the group that was assigned to
complete only the last portion of the task. As reported in Table 3-7, the average number of the red
flags included in the notes sent was 2.06, and the average number of red flags included in the notes
received was 2.10. Per comparison t-tests, there is not a significant difference in total number of
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red flags between the groups. Additionally, we compared the groups to determine if were
significant differences for each individual red flag. Only one of the red flags, turnover in accounts
receivable, was significantly different between groups. None of the participants that completed the
entire task sent notes related to turnover in the accounts receivable department, while 3 (10%)
participants that completed only the last portion of the task received notes related to turnover. This
difference is significant, but this suggests that the notes received contained more information than
the notes sent. This difference would bias us against supporting our hypotheses. Additionally, a
binary control variable was also considered in the models below to capture whether the participant
was part of matched pair.
Manipulation Checks
At the end of the experiment, there were two manipulation check questions to ensure that
the task identity and accountability manipulations were effective. First, participants were asked,
“You had to complete step 4 of the audit program. The other steps were performed previously.
Who completed the previous steps?” Participants could respond “I completed them previously” or
“another auditor completed them previously.” Second, participants were asked, “Are you
expecting to receive a performance evaluation related to your work on the New Technologies Inc.
(NTI) audit?” Fifteen participants answered one or both of the questions incorrectly based on their
assigned condition. These 15 participants are excluded from our analyses below.
Hypotheses Tests
Potential Control Variables
To rule out potential confounding effects, several control variables were considered. These
included measures of overall work experience (EXPERIENCE), familiarity testing accounts
receivable confirmations (FAMILIAR_AR), whether they have performed a financial statement
audit (FSAUDIT), whether they currently worked in the assurance practice group (ASSURANCE),
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gender (GENDER), and age (AGE). The suspension of judgment subscale of the Hurtt (2010) trait
professional skepticism scale (TRAIT_SK) was measured as a control variable.8 Also, as mentioned
above, binary variables were also included to control for whether the participant was recruited in
the first or second collection (COLLECTION) and whether the participant had notes matching a
participant in the opposite condition (MATCH). All control variables were included in the initial
models below. However, variables that did not significantly (p>0.10, one-tailed) influence the
dependent measure were excluded.
Skeptical Judgment
Participants

were

asked

to

rate

the

likelihood

of

material

misstatement

(SKJUDGMENT_MID1), fraudulent transactions (SKJUDGMENT_MID2), and that the controller
is honest (SKJUDGMENT_MID3) on a scale of 1-7 to measure skeptical judgment. These
measures were assessed at the midpoint in the task (SKJUDGMENT_MID1-3) and again at the
completion of the task after all evidence was gathered (SKJUDGMENT_END1-3). Per review of
skewness and kurtosis tests, SKJUDGMENT_MID1 and SKJUDGMENT_MID3 have indications
of kurtosis and may not be normally distributed. As such, we compare groups using a parametric
approach (T-Tests), as well as a non-parametric approach (Wilcoxon Rank Sum/ Mann-Whitney
U Tests). Hypothesis 1A predicts that those that complete the entire task will be more skeptical in
the judgment than those that only complete the last portion of the task.
There was not a significant difference between those that completed the entire task and
those that completed the last portion of the task in the first two skeptical judgment measure
(SKJUDGMENT_MID1 and SKJUDGMENT_MID2) as ratings of the likelihood of material

8

Due to time constraints the entire Professional Skepticism scale was not included in this instrument, only the
subscale focusing on the suspension of judgment. This aspect of skepticism was most relevant in our context, which
involved participants’ skeptical judgment and decisions whether to request additional audit evidence.
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misstatement and the likelihood of fraudulent transactions were relatively consistent among the
two groups. However, there was a marginally significant difference in our second measure of
skeptical judgment (SKJUDGMENT_MID2) when using the non-parametric approach. As shown
in Table 3-3, those that completed a portion of the task (M=4.03) reported a lower likelihood of
fraud than those that completed the entire task (M=4.31) (z=-1.29, p=0.10 one-tailed). Also, there
is a significant difference in our third measure of skeptical judgment, SKJUDGMENT_MID3.
Those that completed a portion of the task (M=4.13) reported a higher likelihood that the controller
was honest (SKJUDGMENT_MID3) as compared to the those that completed the entire task
(M=3.94) per comparison t-tests (t=1.44, p=0.08 one-tailed) and the Wilcoxon-Rank Sum test
(z=1.46, p=0.07 one-tailed).
Results on the skeptical judgment measures at the end of the task are similar. There is not
a significant difference between groups for SKJUDMENT_END1 or SKJUDGMENT_END2.
However, as reported in Table 3-4, those that completed a portion of the task (M=4.39) reported a
higher likelihood that the controller was honest (SKJUDGMENT_END3) as compared to those
that completed the entire task (M=4.00) per comparison t-tests (t=2.15, p=0.02 one-tailed) and the
Wilcoxon-Rank Sum test (z=1.91, p=0.03 one-tailed). This suggests that those that completed the
entire task were more skeptical of the controller’s honesty than those that only completed the last
portion of the task both at the mid-point of the task and at the end.
[Insert Table 3-3 and Table 3-4]
Next, to ensure that the differences in judgment measures are not attributable to the control
variables described above, we performed ANCOVA’s for each of the judgment measures.
Relatively consistent with the comparison tests above, TASK (whether the participant completes a
portion of the task or the entire task) is significantly associated with our third measure of skeptical
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judgment relating to the controller’s honesty at both the mid-point and end of the task
(SKJUDGMENT_MID3 and SKJUDGMENT_END3) after considering control variables. Panel A
of Table 3-5 reports the ANCOVA results for SKJUDGMENT_MID3. TASK is marginally
significant (F=2.64, p=0.06 one-tailed) in the model. Panel B of Table 3-5 reports the ANCOVA
results for SKJUDGMENT_END3. Again, TASK is marginally significant (F=1.84, p=0.09) in this
model. Taken together, these findings suggest that those that completed the entire task were more
skeptical of the controller’s honesty than those that only completed the last portion. While there
are not significant differences among all judgment measures, these results lend support for H1A
as it relates to the third skeptical judgment measure.
[Insert Table 3-5]
Skeptical Action
Participants had the opportunity to request additional information from the controller prior
to completing the task. Skeptical action (SKACTION) represents the number of follow-up requests,
which ranged from 0 to 4. Per skewness and kurtosis tests, SKACTION is left skewed and does not
appear to be normally distributed. In addition to t-tests, Wilcoxon-Rank Sum test results are
reported. Hypothesis 1B predicts that participants only finishing the task will request less evidence
than those performing the task from start to finish. As shown in Table 3-6, those that completed a
portion of the task (M=3.00) requested significantly less evidence than those completed the entire
task (M=3.69) per comparison t-test (t= -1.94, p=0.03 one-tailed) and Wilcoxon-Rank Sum test
(z= -1.96, p=0.05 one-tailed).
Also, to ensure that our potential control variables did not influence the results, we
analyzed the relationship in a multivariate context. Panel C of Table 3-6 reports the results of an
ordered logistic regression with all significant control variables. TASK is significant in the model
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(z=1.92, p=0.03 one-tailed). These results support hypothesis 1B. Per odds ratios, those who
complete the entire task are 11.2 times more likely to collect an additional piece of evidence
compared to those who only complete the last portion of the task holding the control variables in
the model constant.
[Insert Table 3-6]
Accountability
Hypothesis 4A and 4B predict that accountability will attenuate the impact of task identity
on skeptical judgment and action. There are not significant differences between the group that only
completed a portion of the task with accountability and the group that only completed a portion of
the

task

without

accountability

in

any

of

our

skeptical

judgment

measures

(SKJUDGMENT_MID1-3 and SKJUDGMENT_END1-3). Further, there is not a significant
difference between accountability conditions in skeptical action (SKACTION). Our evidence fails
to support hypothesis 4A and 4B.
Mediation Analyses
Hypotheses 2A and 2B predict that missing information may decrease skeptical judgment
and action for those only completing a portion of the task. While hypotheses 3A and 3B predict
that feelings associated with task identity, psychological ownership and meaningfulness, decreases
skeptical judgment and action for substitute auditors. Mediation analyses will be used to test these
predictions.
Missing Information
To determine how the notes transferred influenced the substitute auditors, this analysis
includes the 31 participants that completed only the last portion of the task. Six red flags were
included in the scenario provided to participants. Table 3-7 reports the number of red flags that

64

were included in the notes received by the substitute auditors. The two red flags most commonly
included in the notes relate to the confirmation discrepancy and the large transaction close to yearend. These two red flags directly relate to the confirmation testing. Other red flags, such as recent
turnover in the accounts receivable department and a disagreement with the controller relating to
the accounts receivable testing approach, are not directly related to completing the task. Perhaps
this is why they are less likely to be included in the notes transferred.
We created a variable to capture the number of red flags included in the notes (REDFLAGS)
to determine how the content of the information received influenced participant skepticism.
Results suggest the total number of red flags did not influence skeptical judgment or action.
However, as the prior analyses suggest that participants only completing the last portion of the
task were significantly less skeptical of the controller’s honesty, we also created a binary variable
to capture whether the red flag related to the disagreement with the controller was included in the
notes (CON_FLAG) for a post hoc analysis. Mediation analyses are reported in Table 3-8. The
results indicate that participants that completed the last portion of the task and received notes
containing information relating to the disagreement with the controller (CON_FLAG) were less
skeptical of the controller’s honesty (SKJUDGMENT_MID3) and as such, requested more
evidence (SKACTION). The direct path between CON_FLAG and SKJUDGMENT_MID3, as well
as the direct path between SKJUDGMENT_MID3 and SKACTION were marginally significant.
Also, results indicate a significant indirect path (p<0.05, one tailed) as zero is missing from the
confidence interval. This analysis included significant control variables: FAMAR, FSAUDIT,
ASSURANCE, AGE, and MATCH. While the overall number of red flags did not influence
skepticism, findings do suggest that information relating to the disagreement with the controller
influenced substitute auditors’ skeptical judgment and action. This lends some support for
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hypothesis 2A as substitute auditors missing information were less skeptical in the judgment of
the controller’s honesty. Hypothesis 2B is also supported to some degree. While missing
information does not directly influence skeptical action, it influences skeptical action indirectly
via skeptical judgment.
[Insert Table 3-7 and Table 3-8]
Task Identity
Hypotheses 3A and 3B predict that feelings associated with task identity, psychological
ownership and meaningfulness, will decrease skeptical judgment and action. Mediation tests were
performed to determine if either psychological ownership (OWNERSHIP) and meaningfulness
(MEANING) mediate the relationship between TASK and any of our measures of skeptical
judgment and action. TASK does not appear to be associated with MEANING, but is associated
with OWNERSHIP. As anticipated those that completed the entire task have higher levels of
psychological ownership than those that only complete the last portion of the task. However, once
the proper control variables are added to the model, TASK is no longer significantly associated
with OWNERSHIP. Additionally, OWNERSHIP is not significantly associated with any of our
skeptical judgment measures or skeptical action. We fail to support hypotheses 3A and 3B. These
findings suggest that feelings associated with task identity are not driving the decline in skepticism
for substitute auditors in our sample.
V. CONCLUSION
Often accounting firms must add resources to existing audit engagements due to auditor
turnover and changes in client timing. When a new auditor is added to an engagement, it is possible
that they will be asked to complete a task already started by another auditor. While some
information is contained in the workpapers and might be easy to transfer to substitute auditors,
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other evidence may not be transferred as seamlessly. As professional skepticism has been
described as an attitude or mindset (Hurtt et al. 2013; Nelson 2009; PCAOB 2012), it may be more
difficult to transfer to substitute auditors. Professional skepticism is a key component to an
effective audit (PCAOB 2012). However, regulators have consistently noted that auditors are not
exercising sufficient skepticism while performing audits (PCAOB 2011). Recent literature has
focused on factors in the audit environment that may help or hinder skepticism (e.g., Brazel et al.
2016; Bowlin et al. 2015; Turner 2001). In this study, we aim to investigate whether auditor
substitution harms skepticism.
We predicted that professional skepticism may be lower for substitute auditors that only
complete the last portion of a task as compared to auditors that complete an entire task from start
to finish for two possible reasons. First, substitute auditors may not receive all the pertinent
information. While most information is documented in the workpapers, there is other client
information that the auditor learns not directly related to the task at hand and as such, may not
documented in the workpapers. If a substitute auditor is lacking information about the client, this
may influence their skeptical judgment and action. Second, substitute auditors may not feel as
vested in the task as an auditor completing the entire task. A meta-analysis, examining the
Hackman and Oldham (1976) Job Characteristics Model, demonstrates that higher task identity
(i.e., completing a task from start to finish) is associated with many positive work outcomes
(Humphrey et al. 2007). Per theory, higher task identity influences positive work outcomes via an
increase in experienced meaningfulness (Hackman and Oldham, 1976) and psychological
ownership (Downey 2017; Pierce et al. 2009). Consistent with prior literature, we predicted that a
substitute auditor that only completes the last portion of a task will be less skeptical than an auditor
that completes an entire task because of lower feelings of meaningfulness and ownership. Lastly,
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we hypothesized that accountability via an expected performance evaluation would reduce the
influence of lower task identity on professional skepticism.
Results suggest that participants that only completed the last portion of a task were less
skeptical of the controller’s honesty than participants that completed the entire task from start to
finish. Additionally, participants that only completed a portion of the task requested less evidence
that those that completed the entire task. Mediation analyses suggest that the decline in skepticism
is at least partly attributable to certain information not being transferred to substitute auditors.
Participants were more likely to transfer information directly related to completing the accounts
receivable testing as compared to other red flags not directly related to the task. Specifically, some
of the substitute auditors were missing information about a disagreement with the controller. Those
that were missing this information were less skeptical of the controller’s honesty and therefore
requested less audit evidence while completing the task. While participants that completed only a
portion of the task had lower feelings of psychological ownership compared to participants
completing the entire task, this lower sense of ownership did not decrease skepticism. Taken
together, our results suggest that substitute auditors may be less skeptical because they are missing
information, not because of feelings associated with lower task identity.
This study is subject to limitations. First, the experiment is based on a hypothetical audit
task and the results may not be indicative of the decisions that auditors would make in practice.
To address some of the external validity concerns, we began with an existing task (Bennett and
Hatfield 2013) and used our practitioner interviews to modify the task to fit the current setting.
Also, to request additional information, participants were required to type an email to the controller
to proxy for the time it would take in practice to obtain additional documentation. Future research
could examine the influence auditor substitution on skepticism for a task other than accounts
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receivable confirmation testing. It could be that longer tasks are better able to elicit the feelings of
psychological ownership and meaningfulness associated with task identity. Second, our results are
based on a relatively small sample size. The participants are professional accountants and offer
generalizability despite the small sample size, which we believe to be positive. However, the
participating professionals may have on average greater experience and judgmental capabilities
than a young associate who would normally be assigned this type of task. Results in a less
experienced population may be different and could actually show stronger results.
Although this study has these limitations, the current research extends the auditing
literature relating to professional skepticism by examining the influence of auditor substitution on
skeptical judgment and actions. To our knowledge, auditor substitution and its possible
implications have yet to be explored in the auditing literature. Additionally, the findings have
practical implications for audit managers and those responsible for reviewing work that is
performed by more than one auditor. Substitute auditors may not be as skeptical in their judgment
and actions as compared to an auditor that completes a task from start to finish. Findings suggest
that this decline in skepticism is related to the substitute auditor not obtaining all information when
tasks are transferred. Future research can investigate policies or procedures that audit firms could
implement relating to the transfer of information to substitute auditors. Perhaps, the auditor that
completed the first portion of the task could include a description of their skepticism level or a
brief overview of their client experience with the information that is transferred to the substitute
auditor. It is possible that policies or procedures may help to keep established skepticism from
being lost when tasks are transferred.
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FIGURE 3-1:
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

(1) Entire Task:
Assess
skeptical
judgment

Auditors plan to
receive a
performance
evaluation.

Start

Assess
skeptical
judgment
and action

Finish

(2) Portion of Task/ High Accountability:
Auditors plan to
receive a
performance
evaluation.

Assess
skeptical
judgment

Start

(3) Portion of Task/Low Accountability:
Auditors do NOT
plan receive a
performance
evaluation.

Assess
skeptical
judgment

Start

Assess
skeptical
judgment
and action

Finish

Assess
skeptical
judgment
and action

Finish
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TABLE 3-1:
SEQUENCE OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Description of Procedure

Variable(s)

1. Background Information (relating to hypothetical
audit and task assignment)
2. Audit Task (AR confirmation testing from start to
finish– high task identity; Asked to complete AR
confirmation testing already started by another
auditor– low task identity)



Task (Manipulated – Entire or Portion
of the task is assigned)

3. Accountability (participant expects or does not
expect to receive a performance evaluation)



Accountability (Manipulated only
between those assigned a portion of
the task)

4. Assess Skeptical Judgment (during the audit task)



Skeptical Judgment (3 Questions)

5. Assess Skeptical Action (during last stage of task)



Skeptical Action (Actual choice to
request additional evidence)

6. Assess Skeptical Judgment (upon completion of
the audit task)



Skeptical Judgment (3 Questions)

7. Psychological Ownership Assessment



Psychological Ownership (3 item
scale)

8. Meaningfulness Assessment



Meaningfulness (2 item scale)






General Experience
Experience auditing AR
Age
Gender

9. Manipulation Check Questions
10. Demographics and background questions
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TABLE 3-2:
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Number
27
20
47

Percent
57%
43%

18-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60+
N

4
10
10
4
6
0
7
2
4
47

9%
21%
21%
9%
13%
0%
15%
4%
9%

Tax
Assurance
Consulting
Other

17
20
10
6

36%
43%
21%
13%

Mean
15
47

(S.D.)
(12.5)

5.0
47

(3.6)

Gender

Male
Female
N

Age

Practice Group9

Experience (Years)
N
Familiarity with AR Testing (1-9)
N

9

Participants could select more than one practice group as applicable. As such there are more responses than
participants.
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TABLE 3-3:
Skeptical Judgment at Task Midpoint (SKJUDGMENT_MID)
Panel A: Cell Means (SD) [n] for SKJUDGMENT_MID

Likelihood of material
misstatement
(SKJUDGMENT_MID1)

(A) Entire
Task
4.69
(0.95)
[16]

(B) Portion
of Task Accountable
4.93
(1.07)
[14]

(C) Portion of
Task – Not
Accountable
4.41
(1.28)
[17]

(D) Portion
of Task
4.65
(1.20)
[31]

Likelihood of fraudulent
transactions
(SKJUDGMENT_MID2)

4.31
(0.60)
[16]

4.00
(0.96)
[14]

4.06
(1.03)
[17]

4.03
(0.98)
[31]

Likelihood that the
controller is honest
(SKJUDGMENT_MID3)

3.94
(0.06)
[16]

4.21
(0.58)
[14]

4.06
(0.43)
[17]

4.13
(0.50)
[31]

Questions were measured on a 7-point scale with 1 labeled “strongly disagree” and 7 labeled
“strongly agree.”

Panel B: Comparison T-Tests [Wilcoxon-Rank Sum Tests] for SKJUDGMENT_MID
A vs. D
(test of H1a)
t= -0.12
[z= 0.05]

A vs. B
t= -0.65
[z= -0.72]

A vs. C
t= 0.70
[z= 0.56]

B vs. C
(test of H2a)
t= 1.20
[z= 1.12]

Likelihood of fraudulent
transactions
(SKJUDGMENT_MID2)

t= -1.21
[z= -1.29*]

t= 1.05
[z= 1.16]

t= 0.87
[z= 1.07]

t= -0.16
[z= -0.07]

Likelihood that the
controller is honest
(SKJUDGMENT_MID3)

t= 1.44*
[z= 1.46*]

t= -1.66*
[z= -1.73**]

t= -1.00
[z= -0.99]

t= 0.86
[z= 0.91]

Likelihood of material
misstatement
(SKJUDGMENT_MID1)

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively (one-tailed).
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TABLE 3-4:
Skeptical Judgment at the End of Task (SKJUDGMENT_END)
Panel A: Cell Means (SD) [n] for SKJUDGMENT_END

Likelihood of material
misstatement
(SKJUDGMENT_END1)

(A) Entire
Task
4.25
(0.86)
[16]

(B) Portion of
Task Accountable
4.00
(1.11)
[14]

(C) Portion of
Task – Not
Accountable
3.88
(1.22)
[17]

(D) Portion of
Task
3.94
(1.15)
[31]

Likelihood of fraudulent
transactions
(SKJUDGMENT_END2)

3.88
(0.96)
[16]

3.43
(0.76)
[14]

3.71
(0.92)
[17]

3.58
(0.84)
[31]

Likelihood that the
controller is honest
(SKJUDGMENT_END3)

4.00
(0.63)
[16]

4.29
(0.47)
[14]

4.47
(0.62)
[17]

4.39
(0.56)
[31]

Questions were measured on a 7-point scale with 1 labeled “strongly disagree” and 7 labeled
“strongly agree.”

Panel B: Comparison T-Tests [Wilcoxon-Rank Sum Tests] for SKJUDGMENT_END
A vs. D
(test of H1a)
t= -0.96
[z= -1.05]

A vs. B
t= 0.70
[z= 0.79]

A vs. C
t= 1.00
[z= 1.03]

B vs. C
(test of H2a)
t= 0.28
[z= 0.31]

Likelihood of fraudulent
transactions
(SKJUDGMENT_END2)

t= -1.08
[z= -0.97]

t= 1.40*
[z= 1.23]

t= 0.52
[z= 0.51]

t= -0.90
[z= -0.68]

Likelihood that the
controller is honest
(SKJUDGMENT_END3)

t= 2.15**
[z= 1.91**]

t= -1.39*
[z= -1.30*]

t= -2.15**
[z= -2.01**]

t= -0.91
[z= -0.81]

Likelihood of material
misstatement
(SKJUDGMENT_END1)

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively (one-tailed).
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TABLE 3-5:
ANCOVA Results for Skeptical Judgment Measures
Panel A: ANCOVA Results for SKJUDGMENT_MID3
Factor
TASK
AGE
ASSURANCE
FSAUDIT
FAMILIAR_AR
Model Summary

Hypothesis
H1A
-

SS
0.44
0.19
0.78
1.10
1.00

df
1
1
1
1
1

MS
0.44
0.19
0.78
1.10
1.00

F
2.64
1.11
4.66
6.53
5.92

p-value10
0.06
0.15
0.02
<0.01
<0.01

Adj. R2
0.12

SS
1.91

df
5

MS
0.38

F
2.27

p-value
0.07

F
1.84
1.53
3.36
1.92
3.10
10.64
1.83

p-value10
0.09
0.11
0.04
0.09
0.04
<0.01
0.09

F
3.90

p-value
<0.01

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for SKJUDGMENT_END3
Factor
TASK
ACCOUNTABLE
COLLECTION
GENDER
AGE
ASSURANCE
TRAIT_SK

Hypothesis
H1A
H4A
-

Model Summary

Adj. R2
0.31

10

SS
0.47
0.39
0.86
0.49
0.79
2.72
0.47
SS
6.97

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
df
7

MS
0.47
0.39
0.86
0.49
0.79
2.72
0.47
MS
1.00

P-values are reported as one-tailed.
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TABLE 3-6:
Skeptical Action (SKACTION)
Panel A: Cell Means (SD) [n] for SKACTION

Skeptical Action
(SKACTION)

(A) Entire
Task
3.69
(0.87)
[16]

(B) Portion of
Task Accountable
3.00
(1.30)
[14]

(C) Portion of
Task– Not
Accountable
3.00
(1.27)
[17]

(D) Portion
of Task
3.00
(1.26)
[31]

Panel B: Comparison T-Tests [Wilcoxon-Rank Sum Tests] for SKACTION

Skeptical Action
(SKACTION)

A vs. D
(test of H1b)
t= -1.94**
[z= -196**]

A vs. B
t= 1.72**
[z= 1.79**]

B vs. C
(test of H2a)
t= 0.00
[z= -0.07]

A vs. C
t= 1.80**
[z= 1.78**]

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively (one-tailed).

Panel C: Ordered Logistic Regression results for SKACTION
Factor
TASK
AGE
EXPERIENCE
ASSURANCE
MATCH
α1 (cutpoint1)
α2 (cutpoint2)
α3 (cutpoint3)

Hypothesis

Coefficient

Robust
SE

H1B
-

2.42
0.85
-0.14
3.93
-1.70
0.12
1.39
1.54

1.26
0.44
0.08
1.06
0.95
0.99
0.96
0.93

Z
1.92
1.95
-1.69
3.70
-1.80

pvalue11
0.03
0.03
0.05
<0.01
0.04

Model Summary
Number of observations
Pseudo R2
11

47
0.25

P-values are reported as one-tailed.
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TABLE 3-7:
Red Flags Communicated in Electronic Notes

Notes Sent
(n=16)

Red Flag
1. Confirmation discrepancy
2. Large transaction close to year-end
3. Irregular invoice number (999999)
4. Controller disagrees with approach
5. Employee turnover in accounts
receivable
6. Unusual delay
Average number of total red flags

Number
Included
13
10
6
4
0

Percent
Included
81%
63%
36%
25%
0%

0

0%

2.06

Notes Received
(n=31)
Number Percent
Included Included
25
81%
17
55%
8
26%
10
32%
3
10%
2

6%

2.10
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TABLE 3-8:
Influence of Red Flags on Skepticism
(n=31)

Panel A: Mediation Model

SKJUDGMENT_
MID3
-1.56*

-1.40*

CON_FLAG

SKACTION

-0.84

*Path is significant at p<0.10 (one-tailed)

Model Summary
Outcome: SKJUDGMENT_MID3
Outcome: SKACTION

R-Sq
0.2683
0.6014

F
1.4667
4.9583

df1
6.00
7.00

df2
24.00
23.00

p-value
0.2316
0.0016

Panel B: Indirect Effect of CON_FLAG on SKACTION via SKJUDGMENT_MID3
Effect
0.1683

12

Boot SE
0.1592

BootLLCI12
0.0011

BootULCI12
0.5813

Confidence intervals represent a 90% confidence level
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APPENDIX 3-1: Experimental Instrument
Condition #1 Entire Task
Part One
Consent Information Form
I willingly agree to participate in this study.
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
Background Information/ Audit Program
Imagine that you work as an Audit Associate for a public accounting firm that has been hired to
perform the financial statement audit of New Technologies Incorporated, NTI, for the 12/31/15
fiscal year-end (FYE). As an Audit Associate, your responsibility is to complete your assigned
audit task(s) by obtaining the necessary information from the client. The Audit Supervisor is
responsible for assigning, supervising, and reviewing the audit tasks.
It is typical to work on more than one audit throughout the year. Auditors receive performance
evaluations for audit engagements in which he/she works over a specified number of hours.
Per the audit supervisor’s estimation of the work you need to perform, you WILL receive a
performance evaluation related to your work performed on the NTI audit.
You have been assigned to accounts receivable testwork. Specifically, you have been asked to
perform testwork and to conclude on accounts receivable confirmations.
Below is the audit program, which describes the steps necessary for completing the task.
Audit Program
Accounts Receivable Confirmation Testing:
1. Obtain the accounts receivable aging schedule (Assume the balance of this schedule
agrees to the trial balance without exception).
2.

Using professional judgment select three customer balances to confirm.

3. Draft the confirmations using an established firm template and ask the Controller to sign
the documents before “mailing” them independently (Note: Confirmations will not actually be
mailed in this experiment).
4. Review the “returned” accounts receivable confirmations and make sure that the balance
on the confirmation agrees to the accounts receivable aging schedule. Follow up on any
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discrepancies noted by the customer. If any discrepancies are noted on the confirmations,
determine the reason why there may be a discrepancy between NTI’s Accounts Receivable
balance and the response noted on the confirmation.
5.

Document the conclusion based on the results of the confirmation and additional testwork.

AR Aging
You begin the task by requesting the Accounts Receivable Aged Trial Balance from the
Controller. This schedule provides detailed information regarding outstanding customer
balances and the length of time that the receivable has been outstanding.
You receive the schedule two weeks after requested. It took the Controller longer than usual
with this request as NTI has experienced significant turnover in their accounting
department. Specifically, the Accounts Receivable Manager has recently resigned. The
"Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule" from the client is available below.
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Assume that the balance of this schedule agrees to the trial balance without exception. Based on
the schedule above, you select the following customer accounts to confirm:
1) Abbott Corporation
2) Electronics International
3) Zorcon
When you ask Mr. Smith, NTI Controller, to sign the confirmations, he asks why you are not
testing the accounts receivable balance analytically, which would be much quicker. You explain
that the Accounts Receivable balance is significant at NTI, and as such, the confirmation testing
is necessary to obtain more persuasive evidence. He disagrees with your approach but agrees to
sign the confirmations.
Two of three confirmations returned
Approximately one week later, two confirmations have been returned directly to your accounting
firm. Please review the returned confirmations below. You are still waiting for the third
confirmation to arrive.
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Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule (from above) reappears

Please complete the above Testing Workpaper by filling in the blank spaces below as it pertains
to these two customer selections (5 invoices). The AR balances per the customer confirmations
can be found on the letters above. Please enter numerical amounts (excluding commas). The
difference column is used to capture difference between AR aging schedule and the confirmation
letters. If there is not a difference, please type 0.
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Information Transfer to Substitute Auditor
The last confirmation from Electronics International arrived the next day, but the client has
already left and you are scheduled to work at a different client site tomorrow. As such, you might
need to pass this task on to another auditor to complete.
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If necessary, the Audit Supervisor will send the new auditor tasked with completing the
assignment the following:
1. The "Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule" obtained from the client, NTI.
2. The three confirmation letters that have been returned.
3. The workpaper documentation that you filled in for the two selections.
4. Any additional information that you feel is pertinent to pass on to the next auditor included in
the note space below.

Please include your notes for the next auditor below:

Skeptical Judgment Measures (Midpoint)

At this stage in the accounts receivable confirmation testing, please estimate the likelihood of the
following three events:

Extremely
Unlikely (1)

Very
Unlikely
(2)

Unlikely
(3)

Not
Sure (4)

Likely (5)

Very
Likely (6)

Extremely
Likely (7)

1) The accounts
receivable
balance is
materially
misstated.















2) Fraudulent
revenue
transactions have
been recorded.















3) The NTI
Controller, Mr.
Smith is honest.















Thank you for working on the accounts receivable confirmation testing. As this is a two-part
study, you will be receiving another link within one week to complete a second brief survey. We
greatly appreciate your time and input.
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Part Two
Third confirmation with a discrepancy
Remember that you work as an Audit Associate for a public accounting firm that has been hired
to perform the financial statement audit of New Technologies Incorporated, NTI, for the
12/31/15 fiscal year-end (FYE).
It is typical to work on more than one audit throughout the year. Auditors receive performance
evaluations for audit engagements in which he/she works over a specified number of hours.
Per the audit supervisor’s estimation of the work you need to perform, you WILL receive a
performance evaluation related to your work performed on the NTI audit.

You have previously completed steps 1-3 on the audit program below and documented the
conclusion for two of the three selected customers as described in step 4.
Audit Program (from above) reappears
Below is the Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule obtained from the client as described in step
1.
As described in step 2, the following customer accounts were selected to confirm:
1. Abbott Corporation
2. Electronics International
3. Zorcon
**AR Aged Trial Balance (from above) reappears
You mailed the three confirmations independently and two were returned while you were still
working on the NTI audit. See those confirmations below.
**Abbott Corporation Confirmation Letter (from above) reappears
**Zorcon Confirmation Letter (from above) reappears
The third confirmation was received, but you did not have time to finish the testing. However,
your schedule was adjusted and you now have the time to complete the testing related to the third
confirmation below.

**Electronics International Confirmation Letter (from above) reappears

90

Below is the documentation for the first two confirmations.

Below are your notes related to this task:
**Insert notes from part one

Finishing the task
Please review the final confirmation and Accounts Receivable Aged Trial Balance below to
complete the task.
**AR Aged Trial Balance (from above) reappears
**Electronics International Confirmation Letter (from above) reappears

Discrepancies on returned confirmations are not always caused by an error on the part of the
audit client. For instance, the customer that responded to the confirmation might have made an
error, such as confirming the invoices as of a different date than requested.
Typically, an auditor will gather additional information and audit evidence regarding the
discrepancy to determine if the confirmed amount has been misstated in the client’s records. The
Controller may have information that could be used in determining whether the discrepancy
indicates a misstatement in the client’s records.
The choice to gather more audit evidence is a matter of auditor’s professional judgment.
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Based on your review of the accounts receivable confirmation, what is your choice of action?
 Document the conclusion of your testwork based on the given information. (1)
 Request additional information from the Controller (2)
(Note: If option 1 is selected the task will end and the participants will be directed to the
conclusion before requesting all information and demographic questions. If option 2 is selected
the task will continue below.)

How important on a scale of 1 (Not important at all) to 9 (Very Important) is it that you request
additional information to complete your accounts receivable testing?
______ Importance of obtaining additional evidence (Sliding Scale)

You meet with Mr. Smith, NTI Controller, to ask about the discrepancy.

He verbally states the following:
“Most of NTI’s customer orders are FOB shipping point. This means that the customer takes
ownership when the product is shipped. Most international orders take at least a week to
arrive. The invoice is dated December 31st, so the order would have shipped the same day. Due
to the shipping terms, even though the customer does not physically have the product, they do
owe for the shipment. NTI recorded the receivable in the right year because the material was
shipped on December 31st, and thus, considered a “Sale” and the property of the customer on
12/31. If you want a copy of the invoice and related shipping document send me an email
request."
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Use the space below to draft an email to Mr. Smith, Controller.

Please select one of the two options below.
 Send (1)
 Cancel email without sending (and document conclusion on the testwork) (2)
(Note: If option 1 is selected the task will end and the participants will be directed to the
conclusion before requesting all information and demographic questions. If option 2 is selected
the task will continue below.)

Later that afternoon you receive the following email from the Controller:

To: Auditors
From: Mr. Smith, Controller
Attached you will find a copy of the invoice and a copy of the shipping documentation relating
to the accounts receivable confirmation you had a question about.
The dates on the shipping manifest clearly shows that the shipment was in-transit at yearend. The information on the invoice shows that it was the same shipment that was invoiced on
12/31. The invoice number (999999) was used as the system was down and a manual invoice had
to be created. As you can see from the attachments, proper documentation was maintained.
This should be all you need to complete your testwork.

Attachments:
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In the meeting, the Controller stated that the shipping terms with Electronic International were
“FOB Shipping Point.” This would indicate that Electronics International, not NTI, legally
owned the items in transit as of 12/31/15 (year-end) and that the receivable is properly accounted
for at year-end.

Prior to documenting your conclusion, you have the opportunity to ask Mr. Smith to verify his
statements regarding shipping terms by asking for additional information (e.g. sales
contract). Generally, audit evidence is stronger when verbal statements can be verified or
corroborated with additional documentation. However, auditors use their professional judgment
in deciding when corroborating audit evidence is necessary.

Based on the available information (statements from the Controller, review of related invoice and
shipping documentation), what is your choice of action?
 Document your conclusion on the testwork, based on the given information. (1)
 Email the Controller to request additional information. (2)
(Note: If option 1 is selected the task will end and the participants will be directed to the
conclusion before requesting all information and demographic questions. If option 2 is selected
the task will continue below.)

Use the space below to draft an email to Mr. Smith, Controller.

Please select one of the two options below.
 Send (1)
 Cancel email without sending (and document conclusion on the testwork) (2)
(Note: If option 1 is selected the task will end and the participants will be directed to the
conclusion before requesting all information and demographic questions. If option 2 is selected
the task will continue below.)
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How important on a scale of 1 (Not important at all) to 9 (Very Important) is it that you obtain
this additional information (e.g. sales contract) in order for you to reach a conclusion on accounts
receivable?
______ Importance of obtaining additional evidence (Sliding Scale)
Conclusion (Skeptical Judgment End)- requested all information
You are still waiting on Mr. Smith to send you the requested sales contract. At this stage in the
task, please estimate the likelihood of the following three events:
Extremely
Unlikely (1)

Very
Unlikely
(2)

Unlikely
(3)

Not
Sure (4)

Likely (5)

Very
Likely (6)

Extremely
Likely (7)

1) The accounts
receivable
balance is
materially
misstated.















2) Fraudulent
revenue
transactions have
been recorded.















3) The NTI
Controller, Mr.
Smith is honest.















Conclusion (Skeptical Judgment End)– did not request all information
You selected that you were ready to conclude the task. Please estimate the likelihood of the
following three events:
Extremely
Unlikely (1)

Very
Unlikely
(2)

Unlikely
(3)

Not
Sure (4)

Likely (5)

Very
Likely (6)

Extremely
Likely (7)

1) The accounts
receivable
balance is
materially
misstated.















2) Fraudulent
revenue
transactions have
been recorded.















3) The NTI
Controller, Mr.
Smith is honest.
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Thank you for completing the assigned accounts receivable confirmation testing. Please
complete a few last questions relating to your prior audit experience and opinion of the
confirmation task.

Manipulation Check Questions and Demographics
During this survey you started with step 4 of the audit program. The other steps were performed
previously. Who completed the previous steps?
 I completed them previously.
 Another auditor completed them previously.
Are you expecting to receive a performance evaluation related to your work on the New
Technologies Incorporated (NTI) audit?
 Yes.
 No.
Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements relating to the accounts
receivable confirmation testwork performed.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree
(6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

This was my accounts
receivable testwork. (1)















I feel a high degree of
personal ownership for the
accounts receivable
testwork. (2)















I sense that this was my
work. (3)
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Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following:
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Agree (5)

Agree (6)

Strongly
Agree (7)

The accounts
receivable
testing was
useless or
trivial. (1)















The accounts
receivable
confirmation
testing was
very
meaningful.
(2)















Statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Please select the response
that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too
much time on any one statement.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Somewhat
Disagree
(3)

Somewhat
Agree (4)

Agree (5)

Strongly
Agree (6)

I take my time
when making
decisions. (1)













I don’t like to
decide until
I’ve looked at
all of the
readily available
information. (2)













I dislike having
to make
decisions
quickly. (3)













I like to ensure
that I’ve
considered most
available
information
before making
a decision. (4)













I wait to decide
on issues
until I can get
more
information. (5)
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What is your gender?
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
Which of the following best describes your age group?










18-24 (1)
25-29 (2)
30-34 (3)
35-39 (4)
40-44 (5)
45-49 (6)
50-54 (7)
55-59 (8)
60+ (9)

What is your current job title?

What practice group do you work in? Please select all that apply.





Tax
Assurance
Consulting
Other

How many years of work experience do you have?

Have you ever worked on a financial statement audit?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
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Have you ever worked on accounts receivable testwork during an audit?





No (1)
Yes, one time (2)
Yes, more than once (3)
Yes, many times (4)

On a scale of 1(Not Familiar) to 9 (Very Familiar), how familiar are you with accounts
receivable confirmation testing?
1 Not
Familiar
(1)
Familiarity
with
Receivable
Confirmation
Testing (1)



2 (2)

3 (3)

4 (4)

5 (5)

6 (6)

7 (7)

8 (8)















9 - Very
Familiar
(9)



Have you ever completed an audit task that was start by a different auditor?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
Of all the audit tasks you are assigned, approximately what percentage of tasks are you unable to
complete from start to finish?













Not applicable to my job (0)
0% (1)
1-9% (2)
10-19% (3)
20-29% (4)
30-39% (5)
40-49% (6)
50-59% (7)
60-69% (8)
70-79% (9)
80-89% (10)
90-100% (11)

If applicable, please describe situations that you have experienced that have prevented you from
completing a task from start to finish?
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Condition #2 and #3 –Portion of the Task: Accountable and Not Accountable
Consent Information Form
I willingly agree to participate in this study.
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
Background Information
Imagine that you work as an audit associate for a public accounting firm.
As an audit associate your responsibility is to complete your assigned tasks on various audit
engagements by obtaining the necessary information from the client. It is typical to work on
more than one audit engagement throughout the year. Auditors receive performance
evaluations for audit engagements in which he/she works over a specified number of hours.
You have completed your assigned tasks relating to your current audit earlier than planned and
are notified by the audit supervisor working on the New Technologies Inc. (NTI) audit that they
need your help to meet a deadline on their audit.
Accountability manipulation
Accountable:
Per the Audit Seniors estimation of the work you need to perform, you WILL receive a
performance evaluation related to your work performed on the NTI audit.
Not Accountable:
Per the Audit Seniors estimation of the work you need to perform, you will NOT receive a
performance evaluation related to your work performed on the NTI audit.
Accounts Receivable Task Passed from Auditor A
You have been assigned to complete the Accounts Receivable testwork already started by
another auditor. Specifically, you have been asked to complete testwork and to conclude on
accounts receivable confirmations. The original auditor has completed steps 1 -3 on the audit
program below. Additionally, the original auditor has received and documented the conclusion
for two of the three selected customers as described in step 4.
**Same Audit Program per Above in Condition 1

Below is the Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule obtained from the client by the original
auditor as described in step 1.
As described in step 2, the following customer accounts were selected to confirm:
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1.Abbott Corporation
2. Electronics International
3. Zorcon
**Same Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule per Above in Condition 1

The original auditor mailed three confirmations independently and two were returned while they
were still working on the NTI audit. See those confirmations below.
**Same Abbott Corporation and Zorcon Confirmation Letter per Above in Condition 1
The third confirmation was received just as the original auditor was leaving the NTI audit. You
will need to finish the testing related to this third confirmation.
**Same Electronics International Confirmation Letter per Above in Condition 1
Below is the documentation for the two confirmations returned already completed by the original
auditor.

The prior auditor has also passed on the following notes related to this task:
**Insert notes from part one of higher task identity condition
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Skeptical Judgment Measures (Midpoint)
After reviewing the accounts receivable confirmation testing performed thus far and the other
participant's electronic notes, please estimate the likelihood of the following three events:
Extremely
Unlikely
(1)

Very
Unlikely
(2)

Unlikely
(3)

Not Sure
(4)

Likely (5)

Very
Likely (6)

Extremely
Likely (7)

The
accounts
receivable
balance is
materially
misstated.
(1)















Fraudulent
revenue
transactions
have been
recorded.
(2)















The
Controller
is honest.
(3)















***The instrument for condition #2 and #3 (portion of the task) is then the same as condition #1
above (entire task) from the ‘Finishing the task’ section to the end.
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CHAPTER 4: FRAUD INQUIRIES: THE IMPACT OF QUESTION STRUCTURE AND
RAPPORT ON CLIENT REPORTING

Megan M. Jones
West Virginia University
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I. INTRODUCTION
Audit Standard (AS) 2110 requires auditors to make inquiries of management about fraud as
part of the risk assessment process conducted during the planning phase of the audit (Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2010, AS 2110.54 - 2110.58). One of the main objectives of
the inquiries and overall risk assessment process is to assist the auditor in designing audit procedures
to address identified risks (PCAOB 2010, AS 2110.03). Regulators and researchers have
demonstrated that auditors have difficulty responding to fraud risks with proper testing (Hammersley
et al. 2011; PCAOB 2010; Trompeter et al. 2013). However, Hammersley et al. (2011) provides
evidence indicating that audit seniors are better at modifying testing procedures when more specific
fraud risks are identified. As such, if the client discloses information during these inquiries, it would
likely help auditors identify specific fraud risks and modify the audit testing to increase the likelihood
of detecting potential fraud.
While the fraud inquiry process has yet to be examined extensively in the literature, one prior
study provides evidence that individuals are more inclined to report fraud to an inquiring auditor as
compared to an auditor who does not ask about potential fraud risks (Kaplan et al. 2011). These
findings lend support for the fraud inquiry requirement during the audit. This study aims to extend
the auditing literature by examining whether the nature and type of questions posed during a fraud
interview impact the likelihood and extent of client reporting.
The Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) has offered practical guidance for audit committee
members to utilize when discussing fraud with management (CAQ 2010). While not specifically
geared toward auditors, these recommendations will likely be helpful to auditors when conducting
required fraud inquiries with management. Per the CAQ guidance, simply mentioning the word fraud
can hinder the discussion. The employee may perceive a greater risk of reporting if the auditor uses
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the word fraud, and therefore, will be more hesitant to share information relating to potential fraud.
Instead, focusing the interview on potential risks and control weaknesses (i.e., avoiding the word
fraud) may lead to a more informative discussion (CAQ 2010). These recommendations contrast the
audit standard (AS 2110) that is currently used in practice by auditors, which specifies inquiries of
management that do include the word fraud (PCAOB 2010). I hypothesized that avoiding the word
fraud in line with CAQ guidance would increase the likelihood of reporting.
The type of questions (open-ended vs. closed) posed during a fraud interview may also impact
the likelihood and extent of reporting. Investigative interview guidance in the U.S., the Cognitive
Interview (Fisher and Geiselman 1992), and a framework utilized in the United Kingdom, the PEACE
model (Walsh and Bull 2012), recommend using open-ended type questions to elicit the most
information from the interviewee. This guidance suggests open-ended type questions allow the
interviewee to feel a greater sense of control, which increases participation (Fisher and Geiselman
1992). The first fraud inquiry in AS 2110 suggests a closed type question. Therefore, if auditors use
the questions directly from the audit standard, it is possible they may be missing an opportunity to
obtain information from the client.
Lastly, the current study examines whether rapport between the auditor and the client
influences the likelihood of sharing information relating to potential fraud. Prior literature
demonstrates that clients are more likely to be cooperative when there is commitment in an auditorclient relationship (de Ruyter and Wetzels 1999). Additionally, while interviewing professional
auditors, Bennett and Hatfield (2016) note that audit partners feel that relationship-building with
clients is necessary to obtain evidence to perform the audit. However, prior research has not
examined whether rapport between the auditor and client impacts the ability of the auditor to obtain
information. Rapport-building techniques have been shown to increase in the amount of correct
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information that is reported during police interviews of cooperative eyewitnesses (Collins,
Lincoln, and Frank 2002), as well as a reduce anxiety of eyewitnesses (Kieckhaefer, Vallano, and
Schreiber Compo 2014). Prior research also finds that rapport is most beneficial when open-ended
type questions are posed (Vallano and Schreiber Compo, 2011).
A 2 (Fraud: Mentions or Avoids) x 2 (Question Type: Open or Closed) x 2 (Rapport with
Auditor: Absent or Present) experimental design was used to investigate the influence of these
three variables on the likelihood of reporting potential fraud to an auditor. Participants were
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to assume the role of a client that has recently observed
questionable behavior. Participants that decided to report the potential fraud had to forgo a small
bonus ($0.20) to report the fraud to proxy for the possible costs of reporting in the workplace (i.e.
time, reputation harm, possible retaliation, etc.).
While not predicted, results indicate a significant three-way interaction effect (Fraud x
Question Type x Rapport) on the likelihood and extent of reporting. Findings indicate that
mentioning the word fraud led to a significant decrease in reporting for the group of participants
that were asked a closed question by an auditor without established rapport. The first inquiry of
management in the current audit standards is a closed type question that mentions the word fraud.
If auditors use this question in practice and do not have established rapport with the client, the
likelihood of reporting potential fraud may be harmed. Either rephrasing a closed question to avoid
the word fraud or selecting an auditor that has rapport with the client to conduct the inquiries may
increase the likelihood of reporting.
This study extends literature from criminology into an audit setting. The influence of the
nature and type of fraud inquiries on reporting are somewhat consistent with prior research and
expectations. However, this study demonstrates that rapport between the auditor and client can
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alter these relationships. Additionally, this study offers practical implications for auditors and
current standard-setters as it provides preliminary insight as to how the nature and type of questions
might interact with auditor-client rapport to influence the likelihood of client reporting during
fraud inquiry procedures. Findings suggest that auditors should assess whether they have rapport
with the client before performing fraud inquiries. If they do not have rapport with the client, the
likelihood of reporting will be higher if the auditor avoids the word fraud consistent with
recommendations by the CAQ. However, if the auditor has established rapport with the client,
using the word fraud will result in a higher likelihood of reporting consistent with the current audit
standard.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Fraud Inquiries
Professional standards require fraud inquiries as a part of the risk assessment procedures
conducted during an audit (PCAOB 2010 AS 2110.54 - 2110.58). Per anecdotal evidence, auditors
are currently conducting these inquiries verbally using a script of questions similar to those specified
in AS 2110. While the aim of these required inquiries is to assist the auditor in identifying risks of
material misstatement relating to fraud, it is possible that management or other interviewees involved
in fraud will intentionally deceive or withhold information from the auditor. Prior accounting
literature focusing on client inquiries demonstrates that auditors struggle to detect client deception
in an interview setting (Holderness 2014; Lee and Welker 2007, 2008, and 2011). As such, this study
seeks to extend that line of literature by examining factors that may increase the likelihood that
clients, not directly involved with fraud, will share information relating to the potential fraud with
the auditor in an inquiry setting.
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Prior accounting literature has examined company policies and procedures, along with other
situational factors, that promote the likelihood of individuals to report fraud to auditors or
anonymous reporting channels (e.g. Seifert et al. 2010; Taylor and Curtis 2013; Zhang et al. 2013).
However, these studies have not examined the likelihood of an employee to share potential
fraudulent information when asked directly by an auditor. One exception is a prior study that
examines the likelihood of reporting fraud to an auditor in an interview setting. Kaplan et al. (2011)
provide experimental evidence suggesting individuals are more likely to report potential fraud to an
inquiring auditor, as compared to an auditor that does not specifically ask about an employee’s
awareness of fraud. Employees appear to view fraud inquiries as part of the auditor’s role and are
more inclined to disclose potential fraud when directly asked by an auditor. Kaplan et al. (2011)
lends support to auditors conducting fraud inquiries as their findings suggest this questioning does
improve the likelihood of reporting. As the fraud inquiries are required by the audit standards, this
study aims to add to the literature by considering whether the nature and type of questions, as well
as the relationship between the auditor and client, could influence the likelihood of the client to
report potential fraud when specifically asked by an auditor.
Nature of the Inquiry Questions
One factor that may impact the likelihood of the client to report potential fraud to an
inquiring auditor relates to the nature of the questions posed. Currently in practice audit firms rely
on guidance in AS 2110 to conduct fraud inquiries of management. Table 4-1 includes the eight
specific inquiries that should be made of management from the standard (PCAOB 2010). Some of
the inquiries directly mention the word fraud. For example, the first required inquiry of
management is to ask “whether management has knowledge of fraud, alleged fraud, or suspected
fraud” (PCAOB 2010, AS 2110.56 a1). A similar type of question was used by Kaplan et al. (2011)
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in the manipulation of fraud inquiry being absent or present to investigate the influence on
reporting intentions. In the inquiry present condition, participants were told that an auditor met
with a hypothetical employee and asked whether the employee was “aware of any fraud, or
suspected fraud, or potentially material questionable events affecting the division...” (Kaplan et al.
2011, 37). The results indicate fraud reporting intentions are indeed higher in the condition in
which fraud inquiry is present as compared to absent; however, it is possible that a different fraud
questioning approach may be more productive at bringing potential fraud issues to light than the
current approach referenced in the standards.
The Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) provides guidance for audit committee members on
conducting a conversation with management relating to financial reporting fraud (CAQ 2010). The
recommendations are geared toward interviews conducted by audit committee members. However,
the aim of management fraud inquiries conducted by audit committee members and auditors are very
similar in that both parties are seeking to identify and address fraud risks. The CAQ provides ten
possible questions to start a fraud dialogue with management, while suggesting the questions
should be tailored as necessary. For example, the first recommended question reads: “what are the
potential sources of business influence on the accounting staff’s judgment or determinations?”
(CAQ 2010, 22). All questions are included in Table 4-2. These questions differ in relation to the
inquiries required for auditors by AS 2110 as the CAQ questions are specifically designed to avoid
the use of the word fraud. Per the CAQ, “the mere mention of the word fraud can be enough to
stall a conversation or at best elicit a canned response” (CAQ 2010, 22).
Employees may not be as forthcoming with information relating to a potential fraud when
asked by an auditor because of costs associated with reporting, such as time helping to investigate
the questionable behavior, possible reputational harm with colleagues, and even possible
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retaliation for reporting. Prior research demonstrates that firms with higher interactional justice,
which relates to the fair treatment of whistleblowers during prior fraud reporting, increases the
likelihood of future fraud reporting as employees are less fearful of retaliation (Seifert et al. 2010).
Therefore, by using the word fraud the auditor may increase the salience of their concerns
associated with reporting and reduce the likelihood that the client is comfortable speaking up about
questionable accounting practices. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses stated in
alternative form:
H1a: The likelihood of client reporting will be higher when the auditor inquiry avoids the
word fraud as compared to when the auditor inquiry mentions the word fraud.
H1b: The client will share more detailed reports of potential fraud when the auditor inquiry
avoids the word fraud as compared to when the auditor inquiry mentions the word fraud.
Type of Questions
In addition to the nature of the inquiry questions, the type of question, open-ended or
closed, may also influence the likelihood of client reporting during the fraud inquiry process.
Existing guidance relating to police interview techniques for cooperative eyewitnesses, such as the
Cognitive Interview, recommends the use of open-ended questions in an interview as a method to
shift control from the interviewer to the interviewee to encourage greater participation (Fisher and
Geiselman 1992). While interviewing a cooperative witness in a criminal setting is different from
an auditor interviewing a client about potential fraud, the goal for interviewee participation is
consistent. The interviewer (the auditor) maintains control of the interview, but the interviewee
(the client) has the knowledge that the auditor is interested in learning. The use of open-ended
questions allows for a more detailed response, which generally leads to the interviewee feeling
that he/she has a greater role in the interview, and in turn, generates more participation (Fisher and
Geiselman 1992).
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In addition to the Cognitive Interview recommendations, Walsh and Bull (2010) provide
empirical support for the interview techniques, termed the PEACE model, which is used by
investigators in the United Kingdom. PEACE is an acronym for sequential phases of the interview
process: (1) Planning and preparation, (2) Engage and explain, (3) Account, (4) Closure, and (5)
Evaluation (Walsh and Bull 2010). Consistent with the Cognitive Interview recommendations, the
account phase within PEACE model suggests using open-ended questions, without interrupting,
to obtain the necessary information and then following-up with closed probing questions to
produce detailed and accurate witness testimonies (Walsh and Bull 2010).
Based on the existing interview frameworks and recommendations, it is likely that open-ended
questions will elicit more client participation during auditor fraud inquiries. If auditors base their fraud
inquiries on the audit standards, the first inquiry required of management is a closed type question.
Therefore, it is important to understand if the type of questions (i.e., open-ended vs. closed) posed
impacts the likelihood of potential fraud reporting. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses
stated in the alternative form:
H2a: The likelihood of client reporting will be higher (lower) when an auditor asks
an open-ended (closed) type question.
H2b: The client will share more (less) detailed reports of potential fraud when an
auditor asks an open-ended (closed) type question.
Auditor-Client Relationship
In addition to the nature and type of questions that are posed during the fraud inquiry, it is
also likely that the relationship between the auditor and the client will influence the likelihood of
client reporting. In an experimental setting, prior research has demonstrated employees are more
likely to report potential fraud to supervisors that they believe to be more trustworthy (Seifert et
al. 2014). This finding is consistent with the stream of literature in management demonstrating
trust in a leader can increase employee voice, or the ability to raise workplace issues (e.g., Frost et
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al. 1978; Gao et al. 2011; Tschannen-Moran and Hoy 2000). The trust increases an employee’s
willingness to be vulnerable.
Prior research focusing on the trust in the auditor-client relationships has focused primarily
on auditor trust in the client, and the possibility of this trust impairing objectivity and independence.
Bazerman et al. (1997) note that it is impossible for auditors to maintain appropriate independence
due to the nature of the relationship (i.e., the auditor is paid by the client and interacts directly with
the client). However, King (2002) argues that past studies fail to consider the impact of group
persuasion and norms, and demonstrates that the biases existing from a close auditor-client
relationship are mitigated by auditors’ interactions with other auditors.
Even since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was passed in part to strengthen
independence requirements, research studies have continued to examine and identify potential
independence issues resulting from the nature of auditor-client relationships. Kerler and Brandon
(2010) find that when auditors have greater trust in client management, they are more likely to have
a higher commitment to support the client’s preferred accounting method. Bamber and Iyer (2007)
examine the potential loss of objectivity resulting from an auditor identifying with the client, but
similar to King (2002), they note that this effect is mitigated when the auditor has a strong
professional identity. Lastly, Rennie et al. (2010) survey professional auditors and identify factors
that increase auditor trust in the client, such as an increase in the openness of communication of the
client. Auditors that completed the survey indicate trust in a client is important to some extent.
However, they also stress the importance of maintaining a questioning mindset and implementing
rigorous audit testing procedures to ensure independence and objectivity is not diminished (Rennie
et al. 2010).
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While the literature that focuses on the auditor’s perception of the auditor-client relationship
is comprehensive, there is limited research examining the relationship from the client perspective.
In a survey study of audit clients, de Ruyter and Wetzels (1999) examine the antecedents and
consequences of commitment in the auditor-client relationship as perceived by the client. Among
other relationships, they find evidence that commitment increases client cooperation. This study
highlights the importance of commitment in the auditor-client relationship and auditors having the
appropriate social skills to develop these relationships (de Ruyter and Wetzels 1999). While prior
research has suggested that commitment in the auditor-client relationship is effective at increasing
client cooperation, the literature has not yet examined how simple rapport-building may influence
the likelihood of client cooperation. This study will address the gap in the literature by examining
the impact of rapport-building on client willingness to disclose information relating to a potential
fraud.
Building Rapport
While the interview frameworks, such as the Cognitive Interview (Fisher and Geiselman
1992) and the PEACE model (Walsh and Bull 2010), suggest that rapport-building is an essential
component during the interview of a cooperative witness, a recent review of the literature notes there
is a limited number of empirical studies that has focused on this topic in the context of investigative
interviewing (Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2015). As rapport-building has been studied in multiple
contexts, such as investigative interviewing and interrogation, there is not a consensus on the
definition of rapport. It is a difficult construct to describe as it is the relationship between the
interviewee and interviewer, which can be perceived differently (Vallano and Schreiber Compo
2015). Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal (1990) define rapport in terms of three critical components: (1)
mutual attentiveness, (2) positivity, and (3) coordination. Other research summarizes rapport as
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consisting of “a relationship that results from interaction between people and provides participants
with a warm feeling, is harmonious and natural (unforced), offers trust, and stimulates cooperation”
(Vanderhallen et al. 2011, 112). The literature focusing on rapport in an interrogation context, often
describes the relationship as more of a professional relationship as compared to a purely positive
relationship. In a recent review of interrogation methods, rapport is defined as “a working
relationship between operator and source based on a mutually shared understanding of each other’s
goals and needs, which can lead to useful, actionable intelligence or information” (Kelly et al. 2013,
169). In the context of an audit interview of a client about potential fraud risks, rapport-building
likely would fall in the middle of the two mainstream definitions. The rapport built between an
auditor and client is perhaps more of a working relationship than rapport developed in clinical or
investigative interviews, such as those involving children witnesses. However, the rapport between
an auditor and client is likely warmer than rapport formed during interrogations.
There are several verbal and nonverbal ways in which the interviewer can build rapport
with the interviewee. This study will focus on basic rapport-building methods that could be easily
implemented by auditors in practice. The Cognitive Interview (Fisher and Geiselman 1992)
presents two methods to build rapport: (1) personalizing the interview and (2) developing and
communicating empathy. To personalize the interview, Fisher and Geiselman (1992) recommends
that the interviewer frequently use the interviewee’s name, add personal information to the
discussion, avoid speech or questioning that sounds rehearsed, and listen actively. Developing and
communicating empathy can be performed by the interviewer by considering the interviewee’s
perspective prior to the interview and providing a statement of understanding of the interviewee’s
perspective (Fisher and Geiselman 1992). A recent survey of law enforcement interviewers in
police training reports using similar methods to build rapport as those suggested by the Cognitive
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Interview. These include discussing common interests, disclosing information about themselves,
demonstrating understanding, and maintaining a friendly attitude (Vallano et al. 2015).
While building rapport in an adult investigative interview context has not been studied
extensively, prior experimental studies do demonstrate that building rapport has benefits. Collins et
al. (2002) demonstrate building rapport with an eyewitness leads to an increase in the amount of
correct information reported during the interview, suggesting participants in the rapport condition
spent longer searching for memories and on the interview overall. Similarly, another study
demonstrates that adult eyewitnesses are less likely to report inaccurate information when rapport
is built with the interviewee (Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011). Lastly, building rapport can
potentially reduce anxiety during interviews of eyewitnesses (Kieckhaefer et al. 2014). These
experimental studies are complemented by a recent survey of law enforcement interviewers which
recognize several benefits of building rapport that include, “to get the interviewee to talk/open up”
(Vallano et al. 2015, 374).
This study seeks to extend the line of literature relating to rapport by examining the impact
of rapport in a different setting, specifically in an audit interview of a client to discuss fraud risks.
Bennett and Hatfield (2016) note that audit partners consider relationship building with clients
critical to obtaining information and evidence. Similarly, recent audit interview guidance suggests
that "the most important task that auditors must perform throughout the interview process is to
develop and maintain rapport - a feeling of trust and understanding established between an
interviewer and interviewee" (Seipp and Lindberg 2012, 27). However, prior research has yet to
empirically examine whether building rapport with the client increases auditors’ ability to obtain
information and evidence. While the police interview of an adult eyewitness is different than an
auditor interview of a client, it is likely that the benefits of rapport will be similar. As rapport appears
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to reduce anxiety and increase a sense of trust in the police interviewer, it is also likely to have the
same positive effects in this audit context. Specifically, I expect that when an auditor develops
rapport with a client during a fraud inquiry, the client will be more likely to share information
relating to potential fraud risks. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses stated in the
alternative form:
H3a: The likelihood of client reporting will be higher (lower) when the auditor has more
(less) rapport with the client.
H3b: The client will share more (less) detailed reports of potential fraud when he/she has
more (less) rapport with the auditor.
Building Rapport and Question Type
Prior research suggests that the type of questions (open-ended or closed) posed during
interviews are likely to moderate the impact of building rapport on positive interview outcomes.
Vallano and Schreiber Compo (2011) provide evidence demonstrating that the positive benefits of
rapport are greater in responses to open-ended questions as compared to closed type questions. As
discussed above, interview guidelines suggest the use of open-ended questions during interviews
to transfer control from the interviewer to the interviewee to increase participation (Fisher and
Geiselman 1992). It is likely rapport is most beneficial when the interviewee has more control to
elaborate and participate in the interview. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses stated
in the alternative form:
H4a: The relationship between auditor-client rapport and the likelihood of client
reporting will be moderated by question type such that the positive relationship is
stronger for open-ended questions than closed type questions.
H4b: The relationship between auditor-client rapport and the amount of detail
reported relating to potential fraud will be moderated by question type such that the
positive relationship is stronger for open-ended questions than closed type questions.
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III. RESEARCH METHOD
Task
Amazon Mechanical Turk participants accessed the online experimental instrument
developed in Qualtrics using an electronic link. The task was adapted from Kaplan et al. (2009)
and begins with background information describing a hypothetical company. Participants were
asked to assume the role of the client (Assistant Purchasing Manager). Materials present a scenario
in which the Assistant Purchasing Manager discovers a payment to an unfamiliar vendor, which
has an address identical to the home address of the direct supervisor (Purchasing Manager). Next,
participants have a meeting with Alex, the auditor, to discuss potential risks that exist at the
company.
A case with possible fraud due to misappropriation of assets was selected because it is
consistent with prior literature and is the most common type of fraud (ACFE, 2016). Additionally,
per the 2016 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) Global Fraud Study, billing
schemes are risky based on frequency and median loss (ACFE 2016). Only one type of fraud will
be utilized as prior studies demonstrate that the type of fraud, misappropriation of assets or
financial statement fraud, does not impact the likelihood of reporting (Kaplan et al. 2011).
Independent Variables
There are three main independent measures of interest: (1) nature of inquiry questions, (2)
type of inquiry questions, and (3) rapport with the auditor.
Nature of Inquiry Questions
The nature of the inquiry questions, whether the word fraud is mentioned or avoided
(FRAUD) was randomly assigned. As mentioned above, the current audit standards (AS 2110)
recommend several inquiries that should be made of management which include the word fraud;
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whereas, the CAQ strictly recommends avoiding the word fraud for these discussions. The
inquiries suggested by both AS 2110 and the CAQ are included in Table 4-1 and 4-2, respectively.
To keep the experiment to a reasonable length, only one question was posed to participants by
Alex, the auditor. The question was based on the first inquiry that is currently used in practice from
AS 2110– “whether management has knowledge of fraud, alleged fraud or suspected fraud
affecting the company” (PCAOB 2010). The verbiage of the CAQ recommended inquiries are
different and to avoid introducing confounds, I modified the first inquiry of AS 2110 to exclude
the word fraud in the spirit of the CAQ guidance instead of using one of the exact CAQ inquiries.
Instead of the word fraud, I substituted the “misuse of company resources” into the question in the
condition when the word fraud is avoided. This phrase is based on the ACFE definition of
occupational fraud (ACFE 2018).
Type of Inquiry Questions
The type of inquiry question (TYPE), open-ended or closed was also randomly assigned to
subjects. To isolate the impact of question type, participants received either an open-ended or closed
type question. The space for the participants’ response was consistent across conditions as not to
bias the amount of information provided based on the available space.
The specific questions for each of the four conditions are listed below:
1. Fraud is mentioned (closed type):
Do you have knowledge of fraud, alleged fraud, or suspected fraud affecting the
company?
2. Fraud is mentioned (open-ended type):
What knowledge do you have of fraud, alleged fraud, or suspected fraud affecting
the company?
3. Fraud is avoided (closed type):
Do you have knowledge of the misuse of APEX resources or assets?
4. Fraud is avoided (open-ended type):
What knowledge do you have of the misuse of APEX resources or assets?
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Rapport with the Auditor
Rapport with the auditor (RAPPORT), absent or present, was randomly manipulated
between subjects. After reading the background information and about the questionable expenses,
participants read about the prior interactions between the client (the role participants are assuming
in the scenario) and two different audit managers. The interaction with one audit manager included
rapport and the other interaction lacked rapport. I alternated the order (rapport present and absent)
and participants were assigned to the second audit manager for the fraud interview. Providing a
comparison description has been used to manipulate managerial characteristics in prior research
(Christ and Vance 2015). I followed this format and tailored the description to manipulate rapport.
Criminology research has manipulated rapport using a script for the interviewer to follow,
which either includes behaviors recommended to build rapport from Fisher and Geiselman (1992)
or lacks these behaviors (Collins et al. 2002; Kieckhaefer et al. 2015; Vallano and Schreiber Compo
2011; Vallano et al. 2015). This study uses some of these same recommended techniques to
manipulate rapport prior to the fraud interview. In the rapport present condition, the auditor and
client have known each other professionally for several years. Additionally, the auditor and the
client were described as sharing similar hobbies. The auditor also shows concern for the client’s
time.
Dependent Variables
During the meeting with the auditor, participants were asked one of four possible fraud
inquiry questions (fraud mentioned/closed type; fraud mentioned/open-ended type; avoid
fraud/closed type; avoid fraud/open-ended type) depending on their assigned condition. Participants
then selected whether they wanted to report the questionable expenses to the auditor. All participants
were paid a $1.80 participation fee and could earn a $0.20 bonus. In the scenario, participants were
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on track to earn a $0.20 bonus with their current supervisor. However, if they decided to report the
questionable expenses to the auditor, they did not receive the bonus. Giving up the $0.20 bonus to
report the expenses served as a proxy for the possible costs (i.e. time, reputation, loss of promotion,
retaliation, etc.) an employee would have to incur to report fraud in practice.
The main dependent variable is binary and measured whether the participant decided to
report the questionable expenses (REPORT). If participants selected that they did not want to report,
they were asked how much, if any, of their $0.20 bonus they would be willing to forgo to report.
Lastly, if participants decided to report, they were asked to respond to the auditor’s question given
the scenario. Word count (WORDS_REPORTED) and number of key details reported
(DETAILS_REPORTED) were examined to determine if the independent variables also influenced
the extent of the fraud reported. WORDS_REPORTED represents the number of words the
participants reported to the auditor. DETAILS_REPORTED is measured as the number of key details
reported relating to the questionable expenses. Scores ranged from 0 (no details were reported) to 5
(all key details were reported). These key details include the following five items: 1) there was
activity with an unfamiliar vendor, 2) the vendor’s address is identical to an APEX employee, 3) Pat,
Purchasing Manager, is the employee with the matching address, 4) the unusual expenses totaled
$800,000, and 5) the expenses were paid but services had not yet been received.
[Insert Table 4-3]
IV. RESULTS
Participants

I recruited 179 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to complete the
study. Throughout the experiment, attention check questions were posed to ensure that participants
were paying attention to key details of the case scenario. Most of the check questions required the
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correct response before the participant could advance to the next page of the survey. At the end of
the experiment, participants were asked which role they assumed during the risk meeting. Eight
participants did not respond that they acted as the client and were excluded from the sample.
Participants took an average of 8.2 minutes to complete the experiment. Fourteen participants
completed the study in less than 5 minutes and were also excluded from the sample. The final
sample size for the subsequent analyses is 157 participants. As reported in Table 4-4, 52% of
participants were male and 71% of the participants are aged 18-39.
Recent accounting literature has started to explore the costs and benefits of using MTurk
participants in accounting research. Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017) find that MTurk workers
make choices to forgo wealth similar to participants used in prior studies even at lower wages. For
this study it was also important for participants to have prior work experience so they could relate
to observing questionable behavior in the workplace and deciding whether to report the behavior
to an auditor. As reported in Table 4-4, all participants but one reported having prior work
experience, with 68% of participants reporting over ten years of previous work experience.
Additionally, 66% of participants completed ethics training at work and 44% have observed
someone of greater authority behaving questionably in the workplace.
[Insert Table 4-4]
Manipulation Check Questions
At the end of the experiment, manipulation check questions were included. To check that
the rapport manipulation was successful, participants were asked to complete the bond subscale of
the Working Alliance Inventory (Andrusyna, Tang, DeRubeis, and Luborsky 2001), the rapport scale
(adapted from Puccinelli and Tickle-Degnen 2004), and select questions from the interaction
questionnaire (Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the four items on the
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bond subscale of the Working Alliance Inventory is 0.91. As anticipated, those in the rapport present
condition (M=5.68) rated the bond between the client and auditor significantly higher than those in
the rapport absent condition (M=3.58) (t= -13.16; p < 0.01). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the four items
on the rapport scale is 0.93. Again, as expected those in the rapport present condition (M=5.63) rated
the rapport between the auditor and client significantly higher than those in the rapport absent
condition (M=3.29) (t=-14.20, p<0.01). Lastly, the Cronbach’s Alpha for the interaction questionnaire
items was 0.87. Those in the rapport present condition (M=5.79) rated the interaction of higher quality
than those in the rapport absent condition (M=3.81) (t=-13.31, p<0.01). These results suggest that the
rapport manipulation was effective.
Participants were also asked if the auditor used the word fraud and whether the auditor’s
question was phrased as an open-ended or closed question. However, the nature and type of questions
were intended to be subtle manipulations that participants did not have to necessarily notice. For
example, someone may have been more likely to report the questionable expenses when the word
fraud was avoided but not recall that the auditor didn’t specifically mention the word fraud. Therefore,
these manipulation checks were not used to exclude participants.
Descriptive Testing
Decision to Report
Panel A of Table 4-5 presents the descriptive statistics for the main dependent measure,
REPORT. Of the 157 participants, 95 (61%) selected to report the questionable expenses to the
auditor when first asked. Those that were asked an open-ended question that avoided fraud and
had rapport with the auditor were the group most likely to report (77%) as anticipated. As described
above, if participants selected not to report, they were asked how much of the $0.20 bonus were
they willing to give-up to report, if any. Only 6 of the 62 participants chose to report when asked
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a second time with the option to give-up only a portion of the bonus. On average, these 6
participants were willing to forgo $0.04 of their $0.20 bonus to report the questionable expenses.
[Insert Table 4-5]
Number of Words
Panel A of Table 4-6 reports the descriptive statistics for WORDS_ REPORTED.
Participants reported an average of 17 words across all conditions. Participants that were asked
open-ended questions that avoided the word fraud and had rapport with the auditor reported the
most words with an average of 27.1 words. This pattern appears consistent with participants’
decision to report (REPORT).
[Insert Table 4-6]
Details Reported
Panel A of Table 4-7 reports the descriptive statistics relating to DETAILS_REPORTED.
On average, participants reported 1.4 out of a possible 5 key details. Somewhat surprisingly,
participants that were asked closed questions that avoided the word fraud and had no rapport with
the auditor provided the most detailed information with an average of 2.0 details. However, those
that were asked open-ended questions that avoided the word fraud and had rapport with the auditor
followed with an average of 1.8 details.
[Insert Table 4-7]
Hypotheses Tests
Potential Covariates
To rule out potential confounding effects, several control variables were considered. These
include years of work experience (WORK), whether the participant has completed ethics training
at work (ETHICS), gender (GENDER), age (AGE), and experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk
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(MTurk). Additionally, consistent with Kaplan et al. (2011), participant impression of auditors
(IMPRESSION_AUDITORS) and experience with auditors (EXPERIENCE_AUDITORS) were
measured and considered as control variables, as well as whether the participant has discovered a
person of greater authority engaging in questionable behavior (QUESTIONABLE_BEHAVIOR). I
also included eight items that captured the participants’ perception of the questionable expenses
(PERCEPTION) consistent with Kaplan et al. (2011). These items have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79
and were aggregated into one variable that captures the average of the eight items.
Lastly, proactivity (PROACTIVE) was measured and considered as a control variable.
Zhang et al. (2013) provide evidence that individuals scoring higher on the proactivity scale are
more likely to report potential fraud. This individual trait was measured using the shortened
version (ten items) of the Bateman and Crant (1993) scale, which has been utilized in prior research
(Seibert et al. 1999; Zhang et al. 2013). The Cronbach’s alpha for these items is 0.92, and I
aggregated the items into one variable representing the average. All control variables were
included in initial model below. Control variables that did not significantly (p>0.10) influence the
dependent measure were excluded from the regression analyses below.
Decision to Report
A logistic regression was used to examine the relationship between the decision to report
(REPORT) and the three main independent measures of interest, whether fraud is mentioned during
the inquiry (FRAUD), whether a closed type question is used (TYPE), and whether rapport is present
between the auditor and client (RAPPORT). The model also included the possible interactions of these
main independent measures, as well as four significant covariates: GENDER, MTURK,
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS, and PERCEPTION. Participants in the sample that are female, have less
experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk, have a more favorable impression of auditors, and perceive
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the questionable expenses to be more severe were more likely to report the potential fraud to the
auditor. As these variables have a significant influence on REPORT, they were included in future
models.
H1A, H1B, and H1C relate to the main effects of FRAUD, TYPE, and RAPPORT,
respectively. H1A predicts that interview questions avoiding the word fraud as compared to
mentioning the word fraud will lead to a higher likelihood of reporting. H1B predicts that using openended interview questions will lead to a higher likelihood of reporting when compared to closed type
questions. H1C predicts that auditor-client rapport will lead to a higher likelihood of reporting as
compared to a lack of rapport between the auditor and client. Panel B of Table 4-5 notes that there is
a significant main effect of TYPE. However, this overall main effect will not be interpreted given that
there are several significant interactions in the model. There is a significant interaction between TYPE
and RAPPORT (z=-2.37, p=0.02), a marginally significant interaction between FRAUD and TYPE
(z=-1.82, p=0.07), and a significant three-way interaction between FRAUD, TYPE, and RAPPORT
(z=2.02, p=0.04).
First, I performed comparison tests examining the effect of each independent measure holding
the other two constant. Table 4-8 reports the results. Panel A examines the influence of FRAUD on
REPORT in each of the four RAPPORT and TYPE conditions. There is a significant effect of using
the word fraud on the likelihood to report when rapport is absent and closed type questions are used
(z=-2.15, p=0.03). Participants are more likely to report when fraud is avoided as predicted in H1A;
however, this effect is only significant in a rapport absent/closed type question context. Panel B
examines the influence of TYPE on REPORT in each of the four RAPPORT and FRAUD conditions.
There is a significant effect of type when rapport is absent and fraud is avoided (z=1.96, p=0.05).
Participants are more likely to report when a closed question is used in a rapport absent/fraud avoided
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context. This effect is inconsistent with H1B, which predicted that participants will be more likely to
report when an open-ended question is used. It will be investigated below. Lastly, Panel C tests the
influence of RAPPORT on REPORT in each of the four TYPE and FRAUD conditions. There is a
marginally significant influence of rapport on the likelihood to report when open-ended questions that
avoid fraud are used (z=1.63, p=0.10). Rapport appears to lead to an increase in reporting when openended questions are used during the interview consistent with the prediction in H3A/H4A; however,
this effect is significant only when the word fraud is avoided.
[Insert Table 4-8]
Next, to better understand these effects and their boundary conditions, separate regression
models were run for the two groups of each independent measure. Panel A of Table 4-9 presents
regression results when the file is split by TYPE. There is a significant interaction between RAPPORT
and FRAUD when closed type questions are used (z=2.09, p=0.04) but not open-ended questions (z=1.08, p=0.28). Table 4-10 examines the RAPPORT x FRAUD interaction when closed TYPE
questions are used. Panel C presents the interaction plot, which demonstrates that when rapport is
absent avoiding the word fraud leads to a higher likelihood of reporting, but when rapport is present
mentioning the word fraud leads to a higher likelihood of reporting. Panel B presents contrast tests,
which suggest that when closed type questions are used and rapport is absent, the likelihood of
reporting is higher if the word fraud is avoided as compared to mentioned (z=-2.18, p=0.03). This
finding is in line with H1A. However, it appears that avoiding the word fraud is important when
closed questions are asked by an auditor with no rapport. The word fraud may be more alarming when
used in a more direct closed question by an unfamiliar auditor.
Table 4-9 Panel B includes the regression results when the file is split by FRAUD. There is a
significant interaction between RAPPORT and TYPE when fraud is avoided (z=-2.52, p=0.01) but not
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when fraud is mentioned (z=0.41, p=0.68). Table 4-11 examines the RAPPORT x TYPE interaction
when FRAUD is avoided. The interaction plot in Panel C of Table 4-11 indicates that when fraud is
avoided and rapport is present participants are more likely to report when open-ended questions are
used. However, when fraud is avoided and rapport is absent, participants are more likely to report
when closed questions are used. Contrast tests in Panel B demonstrate that when fraud is avoided and
rapport is absent, those that are asked closed questions (M=0.85) were more likely to report than those
that are asked open-ended questions (M=0.52) at marginally significant levels (z=-1.91, p=0.06). H4C
predicts that when rapport is present, participants will be more likely to report when open-ended
questions are used. The slope when rapport is present was expected, but the effect of question type
when rapport is absent was not anticipated.
Prior research has focused primarily on the benefits of mixing rapport with open-ended
questions (Vallano and Schreiber Compo 2011). However, in the context of this study, the data
suggest that closed questions are more effective when rapport is lacking. I collected the process
measure, personal obligation, for post hoc analysis purposes. Personal obligation is a three-item
scale adapted from Jordan and Roloff (1990). The items had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.79, so they
were combined to capture the average of the three items. Post hoc analyses indicate that those
asked questions that avoided the word fraud by and auditor lacking rapport rated their obligation
to report questionable expenses significantly higher when asked closed questions (M=5.2) as
compared to open-ended questions (M=4.2) (t=2.04, p=0.04). It is possible that when rapport is
absent, participants felt more obligated to report when asked closed questions that required a
shorter response that did not require elaboration.
Panel C of Table 4-9 displays regression results when the file is split by RAPPORT. The main
effect TYPE is significant when RAPPORT is absent. Consistent with above, when rapport is absent,
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the likelihood of reporting is higher when closed type questions are used as compared to open-ended
questions.
[Insert Table 4-9, Table 4-10, and Table 4-11]
Supplemental Analysis: Number of Words and Details Reported
Regression results split by the three main independent measures using WORDS_REPORTED
and DETAILS_REPORTED as dependent measures were also examined to determine if the
interaction patterns were consistent with REPORT.
Regression Results Split by TYPE
Panel A of Table 4-12 displays the regression results for the two models split by TYPE.
Consistent with the regression model for REPORT, there is a significant interaction between
RAPPORT and FRAUD when closed TYPE questions are used in both the WORDS_REPORTED
and DETAILS_REPORTED models. The interaction plots are included in Table 4-13 Panel A for
WORDS_REPORTED and Table 4-14 Panel A for DETAILS_REPORTED. They are consistent with
the interaction plot for REPORT. When closed type questions are used and rapport is absent,
participant responses were longer and included more key details when the word fraud was avoided
as compared to when the word fraud was mentioned. This finding is consistent with hypotheses H1B,
but is restricted to a closed question/rapport absent context. However, when closed type questions
are used and rapport is present, participants responded with longer reports and more key details when
the word fraud was mentioned as compared to avoiding the word fraud.
Per post hoc analyses, participants asked closed questions by an auditor that had rapport felt
more comfortable reporting when questions included the word fraud (M=5.2) than when questions
avoided the word fraud (M=3.5) (t=2.16, p=0.03). It is possible that when rapport is present,
participants did not feel intimidated by the word fraud. Instead, the word fraud made they feel more
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comfortable that it was appropriate to report the questionable expenses. On the other hand, those that
are asked closed questions by an auditor that lacked rapport felt less comfortable reporting when the
questions mentioned the word fraud (M=3.3) than when asked questions that avoided the word fraud
(M=4.2) (t=1.55, p=0.12). While not significant at conventional levels, this finding is consistent with
my initial prediction and recommendation by the CAQ, that directly mentioning fraud makes clients
less comfortable sharing information.
Regression Results Split by FRAUD
Panel B of Table 4-13 displays the results for the two models split by FRAUD. Consistent
with the regression model for REPORT, there is a significant interaction between RAPPORT and
TYPE when the word FRAUD is avoided in both the WORDS_REPORTED and
DETAILS_REPORTED models. The interaction plots are presented in Table 4-13 Panel B for
WORDS_REPORTED and Table 4-14 Panel B for DETAILS_REPORTED. They are relatively
consistent with the interaction plot for REPORT. When fraud is avoided and rapport is present, openend type questions lead to longer reports with more key details as compared to closed questions.
However, when fraud is avoided and rapport is absent, question type does not appear to influence
words or details reported. Contrast tests do not highlight unique findings. However, those in the
rapport present condition that were asked questions that avoid fraud provided longer and more
detailed fraud reports when open-ended questions were used as compared to closed questions
(WORDS_REPORTED t=2.39, p=0.02; DETAILS_REPORTED t=1.81, p=0.07). This finding
supports H2B, but only in the rapport present/avoid fraud context.
Regression Results Split by RAPPORT
Lastly, Panel C of Table 4-12 provides the regression results for WORDS_REPORTED and
DETAILS_REPORTED split by RAPPORT. For the WORDS_REPORTED model, there is a
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significant interaction, FRAUD x TYPE, when RAPPORT is present. Unlike the other interactions
that are consistent among all three dependent measures, this interaction is unique to
WORDS_REPORTED. Per the interaction plot displayed in Table 4-13 Panel C, when rapport is
present and the word fraud is avoided, open-ended questions lead to a greater number of words
reported compared to closed questions as anticipated. However, when rapport is present and the word
fraud is mentioned, question type does not appear to influence the number of words reported.
[Insert Table 4-12, Table 4-13. and Table 4-14]
V. CONCLUSION
As fraud inquiries are required by the current audit standards, it is prudent for auditors to
use this opportunity to obtain pertinent information from the client to plan the audit to address
applicable fraud risks. Prior research supports the required fraud inquiries by demonstrating that
individuals are more likely to report to an inquiring auditor as compared to an auditor that does not
ask about fraud (Kaplan et al., 2011). The current study aims to extend the literature by examining
if fraud inquiries currently conducted by auditors in practice are performed in a manner that is most
likely to encourage client reporting. Specifically, I investigate whether the nature of the question
(avoids or mentions the word fraud), type of question (open-ended or closed), and rapport between
the auditor and client (present or absent) influences the decision to report a potential fraud to an
inquiring auditor.
The CAQ recommends strictly avoiding the word fraud when having conversations with
management relating to fraud risks. Additionally, they provide a list of recommended questions that
are all open-ended (CAQ 2010). However, the first suggested fraud inquiry in the audit standard is
in contrast with the CAQ recommendations as it includes the word fraud and is a closed type
question. I hypothesized that participants will be more likely to report when the word fraud is avoided

132

and open-ended type questions are used consistent with the CAQ guidance. I also investigated
whether rapport between the auditor and client influences the likelihood of reporting. Prior
criminology research suggests that rapport increases in the amount of correct information that is
reported during police interviews of cooperative eyewitnesses (Collins, Lincoln, and Frank 2002)
and can reduce anxiety of eyewitnesses (Kieckhaefer, Vallano, and Schreiber Compo 2014).
Consistent these findings, I predicted that rapport between the auditor and client would lead to an
increase in client reporting.
While not anticipated, results indicate a significant three-way interaction between the
independent measures (nature of the question, type of question, and rapport between the auditor
and client) on the likelihood of reporting. Results suggest when an auditor lacking rapport with the
client asks a closed question, clients are more likely to report when the word fraud is avoided.
However, when a closed question is posed and the auditor has rapport with the client, reporting
intentions are higher when the word fraud is mentioned.
These results should be interpreted considering limitations of this study. Individuals
reading a hypothetical scenario about a supervisor engaging in fraud is not the same as
experiencing the situation in the workplace. However, recruiting participants with prior working
experience minimizes this limitation because participants can imagine or refer to a prior experience
in which they observed questionable behavior. Also, if participants selected to report the potential
fraud, they had to forgo a $0.20 bonus to proxy for the actual costs associated with reporting in the
workplace. While the costs are different, the process of debating whether it is necessary to report
despite the cost is likely similar. Another limitation of the study is that some of the results were
not fully anticipated or explained. While process measures were collected and post hoc analyses
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were performed, future research can explore the findings further. Additionally, future research
could examine other factors that might encourage or discourage reporting in a fraud inquiry setting.
Despite the limitations, this study extends the literature and offers practical implications. This
study contributes to the limited stream of literature relating to fraud inquiries by examining whether
the nature and type of questions posed by auditors influences the likelihood of client reporting.
Additionally, as far as I am aware, the auditing stream of literature has yet to empirically examine the
impact of rapport building with the client in an interview setting.
From a practical standpoint, tips are noted as the most common method of fraud detection in
the 2016 ACFE Global Fraud Study (ACFE 2016). As tips are critical to fraud detection, it is
important that required fraud inquiries are conducted by auditors in a manner that is most likely to
encourage client reporting of potential fraud. Even if a specific fraud incident is not disclosed, clients
sharing information relating to potential fraud risks would likely help auditors better design testing
procedures to address these risks. The findings should be of interest to both auditors and regulators.
The first inquiry in the current audit standard is a closed question that includes the word fraud.
Findings suggest that auditors should evaluate whether they have established rapport with the
client that they are interviewing. If the auditor lacks rapport with the client, avoiding the word
fraud during the interview may improve the likelihood of reporting consistent with CAQ
recommendations. However, if the auditor has rapport with the client, mentioning the word fraud
during the interview may improve the likelihood of reporting consistent with the current audit
standard.
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TABLE 4-1: INQUIRIES OF MANAGEMENT (EXCERPT FROM AS 2110)
(PCAOB, 2010 AS 2110.56 a)

Inquiries of management regarding:
1

Whether management has knowledge of fraud, alleged fraud, or suspected
fraud affecting the company

2

Management's process for identifying and responding to fraud risks in the company,
including any specific fraud risks the company has identified or account balances or
disclosures for which a fraud risk is likely to exist, and the nature, extent, and
frequency of management's fraud risk assessment process

3

Controls that the company has established to address fraud risks the company
has identified, or that otherwise help to prevent and detect fraud, including how
management monitors those controls

4

For a company with multiple locations (a) the nature and extent of monitoring of
operating locations or business segments and (b) whether there are particular operating
locations or business segments for which a fraud risk might be more likely to exist

5

Whether and how management communicates to employees its views on business
practices and ethical behavior

6

Whether management has received tips or complaints regarding the company's
financial reporting (including those received through the audit committee's internal
whistleblower program, if such program exists) and, if so, management's responses to
such tips and complaints;

7

Whether management has reported to the audit committee on how the company's
internal control serves to prevent and detect material misstatements due to fraud

8

Whether the company has entered into any significant unusual transactions and, if so,
the nature, terms, and business purpose (or the lack thereof) of those transactions and
whether such transactions involved related parties
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TABLE 4-2: CAQ RECOMMENDED FRAUD INQUIRIES
(CAQ, 2010, 22)

1

Example questions to improve fraud
conversations:
What are the potential sources of business influence on the accounting staff’s
judgment or determinations?

2

What pressures for performance may potentially affect financial reporting?

3

What about the way the company operates causes concern or stress?

4

What areas of the company’s accounting tend to take up the most time?

5

What kind of input into accounting determinations does non-financial
management have?

6

What are the areas of accounting which you are most worried?

7

What are areas of recurring disagreement or problems?

8

How does the company use technology to search for an unnatural accounting
activity?

9
10

If a Wall Street Journal article were to appear about the company’s accounting,
what would it most likely talk about?
If someone wanted to adjust the financial results at headquarters, how would
they go about it and would anything stop them?
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TABLE 4-3: EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

Description of Procedures

Variable(s)

1.

Consent Form

2.

Background Information –
Hypothetical Company

3.

Potential Fraud Scenario

4.

Description of Auditor-Client Interaction

•

Rapport manipulation (absent or
present)

5.

Fraud Inquiry Questions

•

Question nature (mentions or
avoids fraud) and type (openended or closed) manipulation

6.

Decision of whether to report the
questionable expenses

•

Main dependent measure

7.

Manipulation Check Questions

8.

Demographics

•

Work experience, MTurk
experience, gender, age, impression
of auditors, experience with auditors

9.

Proactivity Scale (Control Variable)

•

Proactivity (10 item scale)
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TABLE 4-4: PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
(n=157)
Number
82
75

Percent
52%
48%

Gender

Male
Female

Age

18-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60+

13
30
48
21
12
10
12
7
4

8%
19%
31%
13%
8%
6%
8%
5%
3%

Years of Work Experience13

Less than 1 year
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-9 years
10-12 years
13-15 years
16-20 years
21-30 years
Greater than 30 years

0
10
23
17
17
24
26
19
20

0%
6%
15%
11%
11%
15%
17%
12%
13%

Discovered person of authority
behaving questionably13

Yes
No

68
88

44%
56%

Completed Ethics Training13

Yes
No

103
53

66%
34%

Time on mTurk

Less than one week
Several weeks
One month
Several months
One year
Several years
Many years

0
4
6
37
29
61
20

0%
3%
4%
29%
18%
40%
13%

Mean
4.2

(S.D.)
(1.2)

1.8

(1.0)

13

Impression of auditors (1-7, where 7=very favorable)
Extent of interaction with auditors13 (1-5, where 5=extensive
experience)
13

One participant reporting having no prior work experience, and as such, was removed from any work related
demographic questions. The total sample size for these work-related questions is 156 participants.
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TABLE 4-5:
Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regression Results for Reporting (REPORT)
Panel A: Frequency (Percentage)[n] of Participants that Reported
Rapport
Open-end Question
Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Closed Question
Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Total

Absent

Present

Total

11
(55%)
[20]

13
(62%)
[21]

24
(58%)
[41]

7
(41%)
[17]

17
(77%)
[22]

24
(62%)
[39]

12
(50%)
[24]

7
(54%)
[13]

19
(51%)
[37]

18
(75%)
[24]

10
(63%)
[16]

28
(70%)
[40]

48
(56%)
[85]

47
(65%)
[72]

95
(61%)
[157]

Panel B: Logistic Regression Results for REPORT
Variables
FRAUD
TYPE
RAPPORT
FRAUD x TYPE
FRAUD x RAPPORT
TYPE x RAPPORT
FRAUD x TYPE x RAPPORT
GENDER
MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS
PERCEPTION
14

Parameter
Estimate
0.56
2.07
1.55
-1.82
-0.95
-2.37
2.02
1.94
-2.24
2.88
3.75

p-value14
0.58
0.04
0.12
0.07
0.34
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.03
< 0.01
< 0.01

P-values reported are two-sided.

142

TABLE 4-6: Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results for Number of Words Reported
(WORDS_REPORTED)
Panel A: Cell Means (SD)[n] for WORDS_REPORTED
Rapport
Open-end Question
Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Closed Question
Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Total

Absent

Present

Total

14.7
(16.7)
[20]

15.3
(15.9)
[21]

15.0
(16.1)
[41]

14.2
(19.9)
[17]

27.1
(28.0)
[22]

21.5
(25.4)
[39]

13.8
(13.8)
[24]

17.2
(28.4)
[13]

15.0
(19.8)
[37]

19.7
(16.6)
[24]

12.2
(13.8)
[16]

16.7
(15.8)
[40]

15.8
(16.5)
[85]

18.6
(22.7)
[72]

17.0
(19.6)
[157]

Parameter
Estimate
0.74
2.25
1.67
-2.09
-1.02
-2.59
2.12
2.00
-2.82
3.66
4.65

p-value15
0.46
0.03
0.10
0.04
0.31
0.01
0.04
0.05
< 0.01
< 0.01
< 0.01

Panel B: Regression Results for WORDS_REPORTED
Variables
FRAUD
TYPE
RAPPORT
FRAUD x TYPE
FRAUD x RAPPORT
TYPE x RAPPORT
FRAUD x TYPE x RAPPORT
GENDER
MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS
PERCEPTION
15

P-values reported are two-sided.
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TABLE 4-7: Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results for Number of Details Reported
(DETAILS_REPORTED)
Panel A: Cell Means (SD)[n] for DETAILS_REPORTED16
Rapport
Open-end Question
Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Closed Question
Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Total

Absent

Present

Total

1.3
(1.6)
[20]

1.5
(1.7)
[21]

1.4
(1.7)
[41]

1.3
(1.5)
[17]

1.8
(1.8)
[22]

1.6
(1.7)
[39]

1.0
(1.2)
[24]

1.3
(1.9)
[13]

1.1
(1.4)
[37]

2.0
(1.6)
[24]

1.1
(1.3)
[16]

1.6
(1.6)
[40]

1.4
(1.5)
[85]

1.5
(1.7)
[72]

1.4
(1.6)
[157]

Parameter
Estimate
-0.42
1.04
0.61
-1.33
0.09
-2.05
1.81
-1.74
1.89
5.67

p-value17
0.67
0.30
0.55
0.18
0.93
0.04
0.07
0.08
0.06
< 0.01

Panel B: Regression Results for WORDS_REPORTED
Variables
FRAUD
TYPE
RAPPORT
FRAUD x TYPE
FRAUD x RAPPORT
TYPE x RAPPORT
FRAUD x TYPE x RAPPORT
MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS
PERCEPTION

16
17

Scores range from 0-5 and represent the number of key facts provided.
P-values reported are two-sided.
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TABLE 4-8: COMPARISON TESTS FOR REPORT

Panel A: Comparison Tests for FRAUD Effect on REPORT

Diff FRAUD
RAPPORT
Present
Present
Absent
Absent

TYPE
Open-ended
Closed
Open-ended
Closed

(Mentions –
Avoids)

-0.14
0.20
0.11
-0.30

Std.
Error
0.18
0.22
0.19
0.14

Parameter
Estimate
-0.74
0.90
0.56
-2.15

p-value18
0.46
0.37
0.58
0.03

Panel B: Comparison Tests for TYPE Effect on REPORT

Diff TYPE
RAPPORT
Present
Present
Absent
Absent

FRAUD
Mentions
Avoids
Mentions
Avoids

(Closed –
Open-end)

0.03
-0.30
-0.08
0.33

Std.
Error
0.19
0.21
0.16
0.17

Parameter
Estimate
0.16
-1.47
-0.51
1.96

p-value18
0.87
0.14
0.61
0.05

Panel C: Comparison Tests for RAPPORT Effect on REPORT

Diff
RAPPORT
TYPE

FRAUD

(Present –
Open-end)

Open-ended
Open-ended
Closed
Closed

Mentions
Avoids
Mentions
Avoids

0.07
0.31
0.18
-0.32

18

Std.
Error

Parameter
Estimate

0.18
0.19
0.18
0.20

0.40
1.63
1.01
-159

p-value18
0.69
0.10
0.31
0.11

P-values reported are two-sided.
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TABLE 4-9: Logistic Regression Results for REPORT
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results for REPORT split by TYPE
Open-ended Type
Variables
RAPPORT
FRAUD
RAPPORT x FRAUD
GENDER
MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS
PERCEPTION

Closed Type

Estimate
1.65
0.70
-1.08
2.02
-2.87
1.13

p-value
(two-sided)
0.10
0.48
0.28
0.05
< 0.01
0.26

2.25

0.02

Variables
RAPPORT
FRAUD
RAPPORT x FRAUD
GENDER
MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS
PERCEPTION

Estimate
-1.50
-2.24
2.09
0.79
-0.82
4.18

p-value
(two-sided)
0.13
0.03
0.04
0.43
0.41
< 0.01

3.67

< 0.01

N=80
Pseudo R2=0.27

N=77
Pseudo R2 =0.39

Panel B: Logistic Regression Results for REPORT split by FRAUD
Fraud is Avoided
Estimate

Fraud is Mentioned

Variables
RAPPORT

1.50

p-value
(two-sided)
0.13

Estimate
0.54

p-value
(two-sided)
0.59

TYPE

2.12

0.03

TYPE

-0.40

0.69

TYPE x RAPPORT

-2.52

GENDER

2.06

0.01

TYPE x RAPPORT

0.41

0.68

0.04

GENDER

0.47

0.64

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-1.46
2.53

0.14
0.01

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-2.08
1.38

0.04
0.17

PERCEPTION

2.28

0.02

PERCEPTION

2.96

< 0.01

Variables
RAPPORT

N=79
Pseudo R2=0.28

N=78
Pseudo R2=0.31

Panel C: Logistic Regression Results for REPORT split by RAPPORT
Rapport is Present

Rapport is Absent

Estimate
-0.85

p-value
(two-sided)
0.39

TYPE

-1.44

0.15

FRAUD x TYPE

0.99

0.32

GENDER

1.36

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS
PERCEPTION

Variables
FRAUD

Estimate
0.02

p-value
(two-sided)
0.99

TYPE

1.92

0.06

FRAUD x TYPE

-1.54

0.12

0.17

GENDER

0.09

0.93

-1.24
1.42

0.21
0.16

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-2.84
2.88

< 0.01
< 0.01

1.85

0.07

PERCEPTION

4.37

< 0.01

N=72
Pseudo R2 =0.17

Variables
FRAUD

N=85
Pseudo R2 = 0.50
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TABLE 4-10: RAPPORT x FRAUD WHEN CLOSED TYPE QUESTIONS ARE USED
Panel A: Cell means for REPORT when closed TYPE questions are used19

Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

Rapport Present
Cell 1

Rapport Absent
Cell 2

0.79

0.50

Cell 3

Cell 4

0.53

0.86

Panel B: Contrast tests between cells for REPORT when closed TYPE questions are used
Comparison
Cell 1 vs. Cell 2
Cell 1 vs. Cell 3
Cell 1 vs. Cell 4
Cell 2 vs. Cell 3
Cell 2 vs. Cell 4
Cell 3 vs. Cell 4

Difference
0.28
0.25
-0.07
-0.03
-0.35
-0.32

Parameter Estimate
1.42
1.02
-0.55
-0.12
-2.18
-1.31

p-value20
0.16
0.31
0.58
0.91
0.03
0.19

Panel C: Interaction Plot RAPPORT x FRAUD when closed TYPE questions are used

RAPPORT x FRAUD
0.86

0.9
0.8

0.79

0.7
0.6

0.53

0.5

0.5
0.4
Rapport Present
Mentions Fraud

Rapport Absent
Avoids Fraud

19

When calculating cell means, model covariates (GENDER, MTURK, IMPRESSION_AUDITOR, and
PERCEPTION) were held at their respective means.
20
P-values are reported as two-tailed.
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TABLE 4-11: TYPE x RAPPORT WHEN FRAUD IS AVOIDED
Panel A: Cell means for REPORT when FRAUD is avoided21

Open-ended Type

Closed Type

Rapport Present
Cell 1

Rapport Absent
Cell 2

0.81

0.52

Cell 3

Cell 4

0.51

0.85

Panel B: Contrast tests between cells for REPORT when FRAUD is avoided
Comparison
Cell 1 vs. Cell 2
Cell 1 vs. Cell 3
Cell 1 vs. Cell 4
Cell 2 vs. Cell 3
Cell 2 vs. Cell 4
Cell 3 vs. Cell 4

Difference
0.29
0.30
-0.04
0.01
-0.33
-0.34

Parameter Estimate
1.49
1.54
-0.32
0.03
-1.91
-1.72

p-value22
0.14
0.12
0.75
0.97
0.06
0.09

Panel C: Interaction Plot TYPE x RAPPORT when FRAUD is avoided

TYPE x RAPPORT
0.9

0.85

0.81

0.8
0.7
0.6

0.52

0.51

Rapport Absent

Rapport Present

0.5
0.4
Open-ended Type

Closed Type

21

When calculating cell means, model covariates (GENDER, MTURK, IMPRESSION_AUDITOR, and
PERCEPTION) were held at their respective means.
22
P-values are reported as two-tailed.
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TABLE 4-12: Regression Results for WORDS_REPORTED and DETAILS_REPORTED23
Panel A: Regression Results for WORDS_REPORTED and DETAILS_REPORTED split by TYPE
Open-ended Type

Closed Type

Words
Estimate
1.38

Details
Estimate
0.58

FRAUD

0.18

-0.33

RAPPORT x FRAUD

-1.20

0.08

GENDER

1.70*

0.57

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-0.90
1.17

-1.14
1.50

2.50**

4.93***

Variables
RAPPORT

PERCEPTION

Words
Estimate
-2.40**

Details
Estimate
-2.57**

FRAUD

-1.88*

-2.87***

RAPPORT x FRAUD

2.26**

2.84***

GENDER

2.27

2.15**

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-1.62
1.65*

-1.12
1.21

3.03***

2.99***

Variables
RAPPORT

PERCEPTION

N=80

N=77

Panel B: Regression Results for WORDS_REPORTED and DETAILS_REPORTED split by FRAUD
Fraud is Avoided
Words
Estimate
1.49

Variables
RAPPORT
TYPE
TYPE x RAPPORT

Fraud is Mentioned
Details
Estimate
0.94

0.92

1.31

-2.39**

-2.24**

Words
Estimate
-0.01

Variables
RAPPORT

Details
Estimate
0.65

TYPE

-0.60

-0.77

TYOE x RAPPORT

1.02

0.47

GENDER

1.72*

1.53

GENDER

1.54

0.15

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-0.16
1.15

0.32
0.76

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-2.33**
1.13

-2.70***
1.56

PERCEPTION

2.10*

3.92***

PERCEPTION

3.41***

3.86***

N=79

N=78

Panel C: Regression Results for WORDS_REPORTED and DETAILS_REPORTED split by RAPPORT
Rapport is Present

Rapport is Absent

Words
Estimate
-1.47

Details
Estimate
-0.25

TYPE

-2.40**

-1.85*

FRAUD x TYPE

2.13**

1.43

GENDER

1.84*

1.48

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-0.89
0.73

-0.75
0.44

2.51**

4.10

Variables
FRAUD

PERCEPTION

Variables
FRAUD
TYPE

Words
Estimate
-0.10

Details
Estimate
-0.31

0.66

1.14

FRAUD x TYPE

-0.92

-1.49

GENDER

1.74*

1.02

MTURK
IMPRESSION_AUDITORS

-2.24**
2.11**

-1.36
2.20**

PERCEPTION

3.11***

3.52***

N=72

N=85

*, **, *** Indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. P-values are reported as two-sided.

23

OLS regression was used for WORDS_REPORTED and DETAILS_REPORTED. Using ordered logistic regression
for DETAILS_REPORTED does not change the inferences above.
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TABLE 4-13: Interaction Plots for WORDS_REPORTED
Panel A: Interaction Plot RAPPORT x FRAUD when closed TYPE questions are used

RAPPORT x FRAUD
30

21

20.6

20
10

7.6

13.9

0
Rapport Present
Mentions Fraud

Rapport Absent
Avoids Fraud

Panel B: Interaction Plot TYPE x RAPPORT when FRAUD is avoided

TYPE x RAPPORT
30

26.9

20.4

20
10

10.4

15.2

0
Rapport Absent
Open-ended Type

Rapport Present
Closed Type

Panel C: Interaction Plot TYPE x FRAUD when RAPPORT is present

TYPE x FRAUD
30
25

26

22.2

20
15
10

16

8.7

Mentions Fraud

Avoids Fraud

5
0
Open-ended

Closed
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TABLE 4-14: Interaction Plots for DETAILS_REPORTED
Panel A: Interaction Plot RAPPORT x FRAUD when closed TYPE questions are used

RAPPORT x FRAUD
3

2

1.63

2

0.98

1
0.78

0

Rapport Present
Mentions Fraud

Rapport Absent
Avoids Fraud

Panel B: Interaction Plot TYPE x RAPPORT when FRAUD is avoided

TYPE x RAPPORT

2

1.9

1.5
1

1.4

1.8
1

0.5
0
Rapport Absent
Open-ended Type

Rapport Present
Closed Type
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APPENDIX 4-1: Experimental Instrument
(adapted from Kaplan et al. 2009)

Consent Information Form
I willingly agree to be in the study.
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
---Background Information:
APEX Inc. is a manufacturing company of consumable materials. APEX has produced steady
operating results, but recently performed slightly below the industry average.

Imagine that you work in the Purchasing Department at APEX as an Assistant Manager and
report to Pat, the Purchasing Manager.

In addition to other tasks, you are responsible for reviewing purchase acquisitions on a monthly
basis for any unusual activity. When performing this monthly task, you note an APEX purchase
from an unfamiliar vendor. After further investigation, you discover that the vendor’s post office
box is identical to that of Pat, the Purchasing Manager. Expenses of $800,000 have been paid
via a check that was mailed to this vendor address. However, the services have not yet been
received.

You are not comfortable with these expenses and consider reporting this incident. However, you
have a flexible work schedule that comes with a great salary and benefit package. Also, Pat is
supportive and takes care of the entire purchasing department, especially in the form of
consistent annual bonuses.
---Attention Checks:
You work for which of the following companies?
o
o
o
o

Google
Apex
Apple
None of the above
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Who do you report to?
o
o
o
o

Pam
Paul
Pat
None of the above

---Background:
Putnam and Jacobs, LLP has been hired to perform the annual audit of APEX. As part of the
annual audit, the external auditors from Putnam and Jacob are required to interview several
members of APEX management about potential risk factors. As the client, you consider using
this opportunity to report the questionable expense transactions.
---Attention Check:
In this scenario, you are:
o the auditor and work for Putnam and Jacobs, CPAs
o the client and work for APEX
o neither
---Rapport Present:
There are two audit managers that work for Putnam and Jacob on the APEX account that will be
conducting the risk interviews. Below are descriptions of the two audit managers and their prior
interaction with you.

Adrian

Alex

Adrian is very new to the APEX account and
has had limited interaction with you. Adrian
met with you once to request audit
documentation. However, Adrian did not
thank you for the help with the audit. In your
initial meeting, the conversation involved only
work-related topics.

You and Alex have known each other
professionally for several years. Alex thanks
you for your help with the audit each time you
meet. You also enjoy many of the same
hobbies. You and Alex typically discuss
shared interests before the conversation turns
to work-related topics.

The Audit Manager, Alex, is assigned to interview you to discuss potential risks relating to the
purchasing cycle. Alex, from Putnam and Jacobs, schedules a meeting with you to discuss
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potential risks at APEX a few days after you discovered the unfamiliar vendor and questionable
expenses.
---Rapport Absent:
There are two audit managers that work for Putnam and Jacob on the APEX account that will be
conducting the risk interviews. Below are descriptions of the two audit managers and their prior
interaction with you.
Adrian
You and Adrian have known each other
professionally for several years. Adrian
thanks you for your help with the audit each
time you meet. You also enjoy many of the
same hobbies. You and Adrian typically
discuss shared interests before the
conversation turns to work-related topics.

Alex
Alex is very new to the APEX account and
has had limited interaction with you. Alex
met with you once to request audit
documentation. However, Alex did not
thank you for the help with the audit. In your
initial meeting, the conversation involved
only work-related topics.

The Audit Manager, Alex, is assigned to interview you to discuss potential risks relating to the
purchasing cycle. Alex, from Putnam and Jacobs, schedules a meeting with you to discuss
potential risks at APEX a few days after you discovered the unfamiliar vendor and questionable
expenses.
---Fraud/Closed:
It is the day of the risk interview. Alex, the auditor, asks the following question:
Do you have knowledge of fraud, alleged fraud, or suspected fraud affecting the company?
---Fraud/Open:
It is the day of the risk interview. Alex, the auditor, asks the following question:
What knowledge do you have of fraud, alleged fraud, or suspected fraud?
---Avoid Fraud/Closed:
It is the day of the risk interview. Alex, the auditor, asks the following question:

154

Do you have knowledge of the misuse of APEX resources?
---Avoid Fraud/Open:
It is the day of the risk interview. Alex, the auditor, asks the following question:
What knowledge do you have of the misuse of APEX resources?
---Main DV:
As listed in the HIT your compensation for completing this study is $1.80. You are on track to
earn a $0.20 bonus at APEX with Pat as your supervisor. You have the opportunity to report the
questionable expenses to Alex, the auditor; however, if you choose to do so you will be assigned
to a new supervisor. The new supervisor will not be able to offer you a $0.20 bonus.

o Report the questionable expenses to Alex, the auditor. You will not earn a $0.20 bonus.
o Keep the questionable expenses to yourself for now. You will earn a $0.20 bonus.
If report the questionable expenses to the auditor is selected:
You selected to report the questionable expenses. Please respond to Alex’s below as you
would given this situation.
**Insert one of the four questions (depending on participant’s condition)

If keep the questionable expenses to yourself for now is selected:
You selected to keep the questionable expenses to yourself for now and earned a $0.20
bonus. How much, if any, of the $0.20 are you willing to give up to report the expenses
to the auditor?

If you do not wish to report the expenses, please select 0 below and retain your $0.20
bonus.
Otherwise, please select the amount you are willing to give up to report the expenses to
the auditor. Whatever amount you select below will be deducted from your $0.20 bonus.

$0.00 --- $0.19
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Thank you for completing the main part of the study. Please complete a few general
questions relating to the workplace scenario.
Manipulation Checks:
Did Alex, the auditor, specifically ask about fraud during the risk interview?
o Yes
o No
Open-ended type questions do not limit or restrict a response; whereas, closed type questions
restrict a response usually requiring a “yes” or “no” answer.
For example:
“What did you have for breakfast?” is an example of an open-ended question
“Did you have cereal for breakfast?” is an example of a closed question
Did Alex, the auditor, use an open-ended or closed type question during the risk interview?
o Open-ended question
o Closed
During the risk interview, you were asked to assume the role of
o the auditor
o the client
o neither
Process Measures:
How obligated did you feel to report the questionable expenses to Alex, the auditor?
1 – Not Obligated …………..7 – Highly Obligated

How much pressure did you feel to report the questionable expenses to Alex, the auditor?
1 – No Pressure …………...7 – Extreme Pressure

How willing were you to report the questionable expenses to Alex, the auditor?
1 – Not Willing …………...7 – Very Willing

How comfortable did you feel to report the questionable expenses to Alex, the auditor?
1 – Not Comfortable …………...7 – Very Comfortable
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How much did you feel part of the interview with Alex, the auditor?
1 – Not a part at all …………...7 – A large part

Do you feel you played an active role in the interview with Alex, the auditor?
1 – No, not active …………...7 – Yes, very active
Gender Questions:
Did you perceive Alex, the auditor, to be male or female?
o Male
o Female
Did you perceive Pat, the purchasing manager, to be male or female?
o Male
o Female
---Rapport Questions:
There is a mutual liking between you, the client, and Alex, the auditor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

You feel confident in Alex’s ability to help address the issue relating to the unfamiliar vendor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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You feel appreciated by Alex, the auditor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

There is a mutual trust between you and Alex, the auditor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

Alex, the auditor, was aware and interested in conversation with you.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

You liked and felt warm towards Alex, the auditor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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You felt comfortable with Alex, the auditor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

You had rapport with Alex, the auditor.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree or disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

---Interaction Questionnaire:
Please rate the interaction between you and Alex, the auditor, on the following characteristics.
Cooperative (1=not cooperative 4 = somewhat cooperative 7=extremely cooperative)
Cold (1=not cold 4 = somewhat cold 7=extremely cold)
Friendly (1=not friendly 4 = somewhat friendly 7=extremely friendly)
Positive (1=not positive 4 = somewhat positive 7=extremely positive)
---Perception of Scenario:
Please respond to the following items as it relates to your opinion of the questionable expenses
The potential magnitude of harm done to APEX is
1 - Very Low ………….. 9 - Very High
The potential magnitude of harm done to the client is
1 - Very Low ………….. 9 - Very High
The number of stakeholders that could be harmed is
1 - Very Few ………….. 9 - Very Many
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The personal cost of informing the auditor of this instance is
1 - Very Low ………….. 9 - Very High
The likelihood that the act by the Purchasing Manager is morally wrong is
1 - Very Unlikely ………….. 9 - Very Likely
The personal responsibility of informing the auditor of this instance is
1 - Very Low ………….. 9 - Very High
The likelihood that the company will thoroughly investigate this instance if reported is
1 - Very Unlikely ………….. 9 - Very Likely
The likelihood that the company will correct the questionable act is
1 - Very Unlikely ………….. 9 - Very Likely
The level of disciplinary action facing the transgressor is likely
1 - Very Low ………….. 9 - Very High

---Demographics:
Thank you for providing your responses to the questions relating to the workplace scenario.
Below are a few final questions about yourself.

Which of the following best describes your age group?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

18-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
50-54
55-59
60+

What is your gender?
o Male
o Female
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Which of the following best describes how long you have been completing HITs on mTurk?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Less than one week
Several weeks
One month
Several months
One year
Several years
Many years

What is your native language? _____________

What year were you born? ________________

Do you have prior work experience?
o Yes
o No
How many years of work experience do you have?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Less than 1 year
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-9 years
10-12 years
13-15 years
16-20 years
21-30 years
Greater than 30 years

Which type(s) of companies have you worked for
o
o
o
o

Organization that operates in one state
Organization that operates in multiple states
Organization that operates in North America
Global organization

What is the extent that you have interacted with an external auditor?
o
o
o
o
o

No experience
Little experience
Some experience
A lot of experience
Extensive
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What is your impression of external auditors?
o
o
o
o
o
o

Very unfavorable
Moderately favorable
Neither favorable or unfavorable
Slightly favorable
Moderately favorable
Very favorable

In your prior work experience, have you ever had ethics training?
o Yes
o No
Have you ever discovered a person of greater authority engaging in questionable behavior?
o Yes
o No

---Proactivity Scale (1-Strongly Agree – 7-Strongly Disagree:
1. I am constantly on the lookout for new ways to improve my life.
2. Wherever I have been, I have been a powerful force for constructive change.
3. Nothing is more exciting than seeing my ideas turn into reality.
4. If I see something I don't like, I fix it.
5. No matter what the odds, if I believe in something I will make it happen.
6. I love being a champion for my ideas, even against others' opposition.
7. I excel at identifying opportunities.
8. I am always looking for better ways to do things.
9. If I believe in an idea, no obstacle will prevent me from making it happen.
10. I can spot an opportunity long before others do.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Summary and Contributions
This dissertation examines audit quality from three different perspectives, and each study
examines the auditors’ ability to detect material misstatement. The three papers aim to offer
contributions to both literature and practice.
The first study examines the influence of the PCAOB inspection process on audit quality.
Prior research demonstrates that audit firms tend to lose clients following public Part II inspection
reports, which describe quality control criticisms (Nagy 2014). However, Nagy (2014) provides
evidence that audit firms also gain new clients following a Part II report. This study adds to the
literature by focusing on a group of companies not previously examined, those that are switching
to audit firms identified to be providers of poor quality audits. An archival approach is used to
determine whether these companies switch to Part II report auditors because they prefer a lower
quality auditor that may not detect material misstatement or to negotiate lower fees. Results
suggest that companies are switching to triennially inspected, Part II report auditors in preference
for a lower quality audit. These companies are not to be able to negotiate lower fees, which
indicating that they are not switching for economic reasons. These findings should be of interest
to regulators as they suggest a possible unintended consequence of the Part II inspection reports.
While the inspection reports are a signal of audit quality (PCAOB 2015), some companies may be
using them to identify auditors that provide low audit quality.
The second study investigates the influence of auditor substitution on audit quality. In
practice it may be necessary to add an auditor to an existing engagement because of auditor
turnover or changes in client timing. When staffing changes occur, it is possible that a substitute
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auditor may be asked to complete a task that has already been started. While some information
may be relatively easy to transfer between auditors, professional skepticism, which is a mindset,
may be more difficult to communicate. Regulators have been critical of auditors when it comes to
maintaining an appropriate level of skepticism (PCAOB 2011), and as such, recent literature has
focused on factors that may influence skepticism (Brazel et al. 2016; Bowlin et al. 2015). This
paper aims to add to this literature by examining the process of auditor substitution and whether it
is a barrier to skeptical judgment and action. Results from an experiment using public accountants
indicates that substitute auditors are less skeptical in their judgment and actions than auditors
completing an entire task. Post hoc analyses demonstrate that the decline in skepticism is at least
partly attributable to substitute auditors missing key information not transferred from the original
auditor. These findings have practical implications for auditors and suggest that firms should
consider adding policies to ensure all information is transferred to substitute auditors. Extra
documentation or conversation during the transfer of a task could assist substitute auditors from
losing the level of skepticism gained by the original auditor.
Lastly, the third study explores how fraud inquiries of management are conducted by
auditors and the potential influence on client reporting. The current audit standards require auditors
to interview management to discuss fraud risks as part of planning procedures (PCAOB 2010, AS
2110). Prior literature lends support for this requirement by demonstrating that individuals are
more likely to report potential fraud to an inquiring auditor as compared to an auditor that does not
ask about fraud (Kaplan et al. 2011). The current audit standard includes inquiries that mention
the word fraud and are closed type questions (PCAOB 2010, AS 2110). However, the Center for
Audit Quality (CAQ) recommends avoiding the word fraud and using open-ended questions when
having a conversation with management about fraud risks (CAQ 2010). This study aims to extend
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the literature by examining whether the nature and type of questions posed by auditors influences
the likelihood of client reporting. In addition, this study explores whether rapport between the
auditor and client may increase the likelihood of reporting. Amazon Mechanical Turk participants
with prior work experience are recruited to complete the experiment, which entails reading a
hypothetical scenario and deciding whether to report potential fraud. Participants choosing to
report had to forgo a small bonus to serve as a proxy for costs incurred in practice to report fraud.
Results suggest that when rapport between the auditor and client is lacking and closed type
questions are used, clients are more likely to report when the word fraud is avoided as compared
to when it is mentioned. This has practical implications as the current standards include some
closed type questions that mention the word fraud. Findings suggest that avoiding the word fraud
or assigning an auditor with client rapport to perform the interview may increase reporting
intentions.
Suggestions for Future Research
Future research can extend each of the three papers. The first study contributes to the
literature by focusing on the group of companies that switch to triennially inspected auditors after
public Part II inspection reports. This adds to the literature because most studies place the emphasis
on companies that switch from auditors following negative events. Future research could
investigate whether companies switch to auditors following negative events other than Part II
inspection reports. Future work can also examine whether companies switch to auditors following
other reputation harming events to obtain discounted fees or a lower quality audit. Understanding
possible motivations for hiring auditors after a negative event may be informative to investors of
those companies.
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The second study extends the literature by examining the implications of staffing changes
after the audit begins. As the results demonstrate that some information is lost in the transfer of a
task between auditors, future research can investigate whether extra documentation or policies
surrounding information hand-off to the substitute auditor can reduce the loss of skepticism.
Additionally, the study does not consider the influence of the review process on shared tasks.
Future research could examine whether auditors review work performed by two auditors with a
different level of scrutiny than work performed by one auditor.
Lastly, the third study contributes to the literature by providing initial evidence relating to
best practices when conducting fraud inquiries of management. The current study examines how
participants respond to one question posed by the auditor after reading a hypothetical scenario.
Future research could attempt to create a more realistic atmosphere by conducting in-person
interviews with more than one question. In-person interviews would be particularly insightful with
regards to examining the influence of rapport on client reporting. It would also be interesting to
investigate whether auditors successfully implement information gathered during fraud inquiries
into the audit plan, and if so, how they modify their plans. Finally, the influence of auditor inquiries
on future anonymous reporting could also be explored. It may be that the conversation with the
auditor prompts an employee to report but they prefer to do so anonymously.
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